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Abstract 
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has made all the more clear that public health is a 
public good. Public health interventions try to encourage contributions to this public 
good. Digital public health interventions are increasingly being used to complement 
traditional public health interventions. The rollout of digital contact tracing apps 
during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is a prominent example. We review the literature 
on how participation in such digital public health interventions could be fostered, 
provide an overview of digital contact tracing as one such intervention, provide policy 
recommendations on how to increase its adoption and usage as well as 
recommendations for further research. 
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The beginning of the 2020s has been shaped by a major worldwide health crisis: 
the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. As of end of October, 2020, about 45.67 million 
infections with the new coronavirus and about 1.19 million deaths of people tested 
positive for the virus have been reported worldwide (Johns Hopkins University, 
2020), by far exceeding 8,096 reported infections and 774 deaths attributed to the 
SARS-CoV-1 pandemic of 2002 and 2003 (WHO, 2003). In the absence of effective 
pharmaceutical interventions and of sufficient testing and tracing capacities, many 
governments repeatedly turned to limiting freedom of movement in order contain the 
spread of the virus. However, school and business closures, social distancing, travel 
restrictions, mandatory quarantine and other drastic measures triggered significant 
adverse social and economic effects (Deb et al., 2020; Mulligan, 2020). As a 
consequence, earlier proposals to make better use of digital measures to manage the 
pandemic became more widely discussed (Budd et al., 2020; Ting et al., 2020). In an 
influential epidemiological modelling study published at the end of March 2020 
Ferretti et al. (2020) suggested that sufficiently capable and widely used digital 
contact tracing apps could dramatically reduce the need for more restrictive 
containment measures. This proposal gained wide traction in the public debate and 
among policy-makers, which Figure 1 illustrates with the number of internet searches 
for related terms. Over the course of spring and summer 2020, digital contact tracing 
became the poster child of the new class of digital public health interventions. 
As digital contact tracing apps were being launched over spring and summer 
2020, it became increasingly clear that participation rates lacked behind expectations 
and behind of what was necessary to reach the full technological potential. As far as 
adoption rates were being published by the respective government agencies and 
private initiatives, adoption curves relatively quickly levelled off, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. Many aspects of the public debate that ensued had little to do with the 
specifics of digital contact tracing but with digital public health interventions in 
general: Should participation in such interventions be made mandatory? How to 
ensure data protection? Should users be nudged towards using interventions, such 
 



















































Figure 2: Adoption of digital contact tracing apps in Singapore, Germany and Switzerland 
Singapore's TraceTogether app was launched on March 20, 2020. Germany's Corona-Warn-App was 
launched on June 16, 2020. Switzerland's SwissCovid app was launched on June 25, 2020. The 
cumulated number of downloads until a respective date was divided by the total number of inhabitants 
in the respective country as of June 30, 2020 (Bundesamt für Statistik (BFS), 2020a; Statistisches 
Bundesamt (Destatis), 2020; Department of Statistics Singapore, 2020). For Switzerland, the number 
of app downloads is frequently published by the Bundesamt für Statistik (BFS) (2020b). For Germany, 
the cumulated number of downloads is irregularly published by the German Robert Koch-Institut (RKI) 
(2020). For Singapore, the cumulated number of downloads is irregularly updated on the app's website 
(Government of Singapore, 2020), which we reconstructed with the Internet Archive's Wayback 
Machine. The number of downloads does not correspond to the number of active users, since users could 
have uninstalled the app again or could have turned off Bluetooth. 
as by installing mobile apps by default? Should incentives for adoption be put in 
place or would they crowd out intrinsic motivation? All these questions similarly 
concern other DPHIs, such using smart watch data or electronic health records to 
monitor and manage immediate or more slowly moving public health crises. 
In this paper we address the question of how the participation in digital contact 
tracing and other digital public health interventions could be fostered. We use the 
term ‘participation’ as an umbrella term for both ‘adoption’, i.e. the first acceptance 
of the new intervention, and ‘usage’, i.e. the active or passive use after adoption. We 
proceed as follows: First, we introduce the argument that public health is a public 
good and how contributions to the public good can be encouraged through different 
types of interventions. Second, we comprehensively review the literature of economics 
and – if germane – other fields relevant to fostering participation in digital public 
health interventions. Third, we provide a detailed overview over digital contact 
tracing as a digital public health intervention. Fourth, we deduct policy 
recommendations on how to reach wider participation in digital contact tracing. 
Lastly, we provide recommendations for further research and encouragement to 































2. Public health as a public good 
Beaglehole et al. (2004) define public health as concerted efforts to maintain 
desirable health outcomes of the general population or make positive and sustainable 
changes to undesirable ones. The term describes both an interdisciplinary research 
field and a policy goal. Public health interventions are means to achieve this goal. 
Multiple actors like the health care and education system, government agencies, the 
media and the general public are involved in those actions (Turnock, 2016, pp. 13-
14). The achievement of the goal of public health can be measured via indicators of 
population-wide health outcomes, such as life expectancy or the prevalence of certain 
diseases (Turnock, 2016, p. 16).  
Public health has the two defining characteristics of public goods (Samuelson, 
1954). First, it is non-excludable, meaning that everyone within a community profits 
from the benefits of good public health (Siegal et al., 2009). For instance, the benefits 
of herd immunity through vaccinations or lower levels of pollution in potable water 
due to environmental regulation are usually available to all members of a community 
and cannot be restricted to a certain group. Second, public health is often 
characterized by non-rivalry in consumption. Increasing the number of people 
benefiting from an already existing good does not lead to additional costs of 
production of that good and does not reduce other individuals’ utility from 
consumption (Feachem & Medlin, 2002). For instance, the costs of achieving herd 
immunity do not increase when an additional individual benefits from it. This public 
good nature implies that an individual’s efforts to contribute to public health, such 
as getting vaccinated or avoiding to smoke in the presence of others, unfold positive 
externalities while non-participation can lead to negative externalities (Elliott & 
Golub, 2019). In a globalized world, public health even becomes a global public good 
with non-excludability and non-rivalry not being restricted to the population of only 
one country or a group of countries. This particularly concerns easily transmittable 
diseases such as COVID-19, which do not stop at country borders (Feachem & 
Medlin, 2002).  
3. Traditional and digital public health interventions 
With public health having characteristics of a public good, public health 
interventions can be thought of as practical means to implement public good 
provision. A public health intervention is a bundle of actions aiming at a common 
goal of ameliorating or maintaining an aspect of population-wide health. These 
interventions have to be differentiated from clinical interventions, which attempt to 
improve health at the individual level (Rychetnik et al., 2002). From a technological 
perspective, one can subdivide public health interventions into two groups: 
traditional public health interventions (TPHIs) relying only on manual activities and 
analogous technologies as opposed to digital public health interventions (DPHIs) 
which are based on or delivered via digital technology like smartphones or the 
internet (Murray et al., 2016).  
4 
 
3.1. Traditional public health interventions 
Traditional public health interventions contribute to improvements in 
population health but also face many challenges. Prominent examples of TPHIs 
which are associated with large-scale successes in the field in past decades are 
vaccination campaigns. They often have the goal of achieving herd immunity for 
infectious diseases, such as measles or poliomyelitis (Mah et al., 2011). Other common 
interventions include monitoring food security, environmental hazards and health 
system quality, infectious disease surveillance and management of disease outbreaks, 
or education campaigns (e.g. aiming at increasing seat belts usage or promoting 
workplace safety). More generally, interventions are usually implemented as some 
form of preventive measure, education campaign, monitoring activity or regulation 
(Turnock, 2016, pp. 16-17, 27). 
Many traditional public health interventions share common challenges. First, 
their scalability is often limited. Second, rolling out TPHIs at most times requires 
strong institutions, such as health authorities. Both challenges particularly 
disadvantage developing countries, which are often in high need for public health 
interventions but frequently lack the resources and infrastructure to implement them. 
At the same time, resources and infrastructure also vary within a developing country. 
For instance, remote areas are difficult to reach, which makes interventions that 
require physical presence particularly difficult to implement (Mehl & Labrique, 2014). 
Third, many public health interventions require frequent or even permanent 
implementation, which is difficult to achieve with TPHIs (Bennett & Glasgow, 2009). 
For instance, a one-time education campaign might not be suited to bring about 
sustained behavioral change in the targeted individuals. Fourth, social dynamics 
around interventions can become pretty complex. For instance, when participation 
in an intervention is observable to others, it could lead to stigmatization, as has been 
observed with HIV testing (Young et al., 2009).  
3.2. Digital public health interventions 
Digital public health interventions have the potential to alleviate some of the 
challenges traditional public health interventions face. For instance, public health 
interventions can build on communication channels such as internet websites, social 
media and smartphone applications to individually tailor messages and education 
program in order to support health behavior changes and communicate warnings and 
health advice. These channels also enable symptoms to be reported for disease control 
and prediction or to remind individuals of preventive examinations (Bennett & 
Glasgow, 2009; Budd et al., 2020; Aiello et al., 2020). Interventions like the 
monitoring of blood pressure via a smartphone-integrated sensor (Chandrasekhar et 
al., 2018) or the continued screening for atrial fibrillation via a smartwatch based on 
machine learning algorithms (Perez et al., 2019) could be made possible by collective 
data contributions. Donations to digital datasets also form the base for the 
development of precision medicine (Kohane, 2015). As mentioned previously, the 
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic seems to have accelerated the integration of digital 
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technologies in public health, with digital contact tracing being a particularly 
promising technology (Ferretti et al., 2020). Those DPHIs often require not only 
support from institutions but also individual participation of a larger share of the 
population in order to be effective. 
An appealing feature of most DPHIs is their good scalability and their 
complementarity to TPHIs. Low operating and marginal costs after the first 
introduction, reduced human resource needs and the ease of digital data transmission 
facilitate access by a large share of the population – even in remote areas - within 
short time (Bennett & Glasgow, 2009). DPHIs have the potential to act as 
complements to TPHIs (Mehl & Labrique, 2014). For instance, sending reminders or 
enabling registration via smartphone apps or e-mail for a TPHI like a vaccination 
campaign could increase participation (Milkman et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, DPHIs have several advantages that might lead to increased reach 
and effectiveness compared to TPHIs. First, digital technology could increase the 
participation in certain interventions by ensuring anonymity for the participants and 
thereby reducing the risk of stigmatization (Andriesen et al., 2017). Second, DPHIs 
that are individually tailored and delivered via portable devices which people use in 
their daily lives can induce more sustained health behavior changes and lower 
intervention drop-out rates through the frequent interaction with targeted 
individuals. The potential to generate peer support in online interventions might also 
be helpful to this end (Bennett & Glasgow, 2009). Third, since digital interventions 
can be rolled out in a decentralized manner without government support, they 
present an opportunity to support developing countries with weak institutions from 
abroad (Mehl & Labrique, 2014). Fourth, DPHIs can profit from the analysis of real-
time data – both related and not related to health – in order to identify behavioral 
patterns that have not been observable before (Aiello et al., 2020).  
However, the use of digital technologies in the realm of public health is also 
associated with new challenges. Before the implementation of a DPHI, its 
development can have high costs (Bennett & Glasgow, 2009). The development and 
implementation process further might require public-private partnerships and needs 
to consider aspects of technology compatibility (Osman et al., 2020). The technology 
stacks of DPHIs usually require suitable infrastructure as well as wide-spread access 
and digital literacy of the population and the public health workforce (Budd et al., 
2020). During the implementation of a DPHI, the digital collection and processing of 
data raises concerns over privacy issues and patterns of discrimination in algorithmic 
decision making (Price & Cohen, 2019). Regarding the aspect of information 
provision, DPHIs could be vulnerable to the spread of false information and the 
misinterpretation of accurate information due to more decentralized approaches and 
the absence of a tight monitoring (McNamee et al., 2016). Furthermore, the 
anonymity and sometimes low intensity of DPHIs has also been associated with high 
attrition rates (Bennett & Glasgow, 2009). Finally, after rollout out a DPHI, its 




4. Determinants of the decision to participate in digital 
public health interventions 
The decision to participate in DPHIs is shaped by the perceived costs and 
benefits. A rational individual’s decision is driven by weighing the private costs of 
DPHI participation, such as monetary costs, effort, switching costs, risk of privacy 
invasion, against the private benefits, such as improvements in own health outcomes 
or the desirable feeling of doing good. An individual will maximize its own utility 
and decide in favor of the intervention if the benefits outweigh the costs. However, 
an individual’s cost-benefit analysis does not necessarily reflect the true costs and 
benefits, since individuals often lack perfect information and might base their 
judgements on misperceptions (Nyhan, 2020). Furthermore, rationality can be 
bounded and cognitive and behavioral biases can affect decision-making (Siegal et 
al., 2009; Thaler, 2018). 
The decision to participate in a public health intervention will also usually be 
made within a social network, which might alter an individual’s perceived as well as 
actual costs and benefits from participation. This is especially true for DPHIs that 
often require the participation of a large number of individuals within a community. 
The presence of other individuals can affect the cost-benefit-analysis in multiple ways. 
First, a participation decision might pose costs (negative externalities) or benefits 
(positive externalities) to others. In some circumstances, these externalities might be 
considered in individual decision-making, as for instance with altruistic motives 
(Anderson et al., 1998). In other cases, they might not be considered, possibly leading 
to suboptimal social welfare outcomes (Andreoni, 1995a). Second, the participation 
decision of other individuals could also directly or indirectly change an individual’s 
utility from participation. Such network effects are present if an individual’s utility 
from adopting and using a DPHI increases with the number of other adopters. This 
can be most prominently observed for mobile applications with the purpose of 
enabling communication between individuals using compatible technology (Rohlfs, 
1974; Bonardi et al., 2020). Third, an individual might consider how others view her 
participation decision in the context of reputational concerns or social norms 
(Daughety & Reinganum, 2010). Fourth, the presence of others within a social 
network also affects the way how and when an individual becomes aware of the 
existence of an intervention and which expectations are formed about the 
intervention’s costs and benefits (Banerjee, 1992; Young, 2009). 
In the following subsections, we review the literature relevant to the decision to 
participate in DPHIs in more detail. First, we outline common issues to public good 
provision, which apply to basically all public health interventions. We focus on the 
need to solve cooperation issues, the need for trust in the intervention, the need to 
address misperceptions about the intervention, as well as information avoidance 
behavior. Second, we outline decision criteria specific to public health interventions, 
such as the conditionality on the personal and public health situation, the integration 
of the intervention in the wider health system as well as credence good issues. Third, 
we review aspects of the decision to participate which are specific to the digital realm, 
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particularly privacy concerns, the digital divide as well as technology design and 
compatibility. Fourth, we review the relevant innovation diffusion literature. 
4.1. Common issues in public good provision 
4.1.1. Cooperation 
DPHIs face the same “free-riding” problems as other public good provision 
measures. Due to the characteristics of public health as a public good, individuals 
are able to fully benefit from good public health without incurring any costs. They 
cannot be hindered to do this even if they did not participate in the intervention. 
Even though cooperation would be mutually beneficial, it does not occur or cannot 
be sustained due to individual incentives to maximize private utility by not 
contributing without considering public benefits (Fairfield & Engel, 2015; Frischmann 
et al., 2019). This would suggest high hurdles to rolling out DPHIs. Even small 
(perceived) costs of participation might hinder individuals’ adoption, if they are able 
to free-ride on the non-excludable and non-rivalrous benefits resulting from the 
intervention. 
However, people have often been found to contribute more to the public good 
than one would expect based on the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory 
(Andreoni, 1995a; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010). For instance, Andreoni (1995a) 
conducts a public-goods experiment where a Pareto optimal outcome would result 
when every participant contributes her whole endowment but contributing nothing 
is the dominant strategy for a rational self-interested individual. He finds that across 
ten rounds of this game the average contributions are 44 percent of endowments and 
on average only 28 percent of subjects per round free-ride. Even though cooperation 
has been claimed to be especially difficult to achieve with increasing group size due 
to the low marginal significance of individual contributions, experiments show that 
individual public good contributions within groups of up to 100 participants are of 
similar size compared to those of smaller groups (Weimann et al., 2019). Besides 
experimental evidence, observational studies confirm that public good provision via 
private contributions does not necessarily fail. A large share of US-Americans is 
involved in donations every year and a significant number of people donate blood 
without receiving monetary rewards (DellaVigna et al., 2012; Meyer & Tripodi, 
2018).  
A common explanation for these findings of cooperation in public good provision 
is that individuals do not only care about their direct benefits from consuming the 
public good but that also intrinsic motivations, such as concerns about one’s self-
image and others’ wellbeing, and concerns about one’s reputation enter into an 
individual’s utility function (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). The warm glow of giving as 
described by Andreoni (1990) might increase the marginal private benefit from 
contributing to the public good since an individual enjoys the act of giving. 
Furthermore, an individual might be motivated by purely altruistic motives meaning 
that the positive outcomes of others directly affect her utility function in a positive 
way (Anderson et al., 1998). A preference for reciprocity, meaning that utility-
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maximizing behavior is restricted in a way that an individual responds to the 
contributions of others by contributing (and punishes non-contribution by not 
contributing), might also at least partially explain cooperative behavior in public 
goods settings (Fehr & Gächter, 2000a; Croson, 2007). 
Indeed, intrinsic motives and reputational concerns have been found to play a 
role in experiments and real-world settings. Andreoni (1995b) finds experimental 
evidence that people are significantly more motivated to cooperate in public good 
provision when there is a prospect of imposing a positive externality on others than 
when there is a prospect to avoid a negative externality. Frey & Meier (2004) and 
Fischbacher & Gächter (2010) present experimental evidence that preferences for 
public good contribution are distributed heterogeneously across individuals. A large 
share of people contributes conditional on believing that others also contribute, 
suggesting some form of – at least imperfectly – reciprocal behavior. Evidence from 
Israel (Wells et al., 2020) suggests that prosocial preferences like altruism played a 
role in parents’ decision to have their children participate in a polio vaccination 
campaign that mainly involved public and not private benefits. Campos-Mercade et 
al. (2020) make use of representative Swedish survey data and show that social 
preferences are positively associated with contributing to the public good of disease 
control during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic by adhering to public health 
recommendations like social distancing. Similarly, the positive effect of reputational 
concerns and social pressure on individual’s willingness to donate is confirmed by 
experiments by Ariely et al. (2009) and DellaVigna et al. (2012). Rogers et al. (2016) 
find that the perceived observability of their action has a positive impact on the 
decision to vote among more than 770,000 US citizens.  
Even though empirical evidence suggests that cooperation regarding DPHIs will 
occur in some form, it also suggests that it will not occur at a Pareto-optimal level 
as, for instance, a public-goods experiment by Andreoni (1995a) suggests. 
Additionally, public good contributions might decrease over time so that while 
cooperation in the first adoption of a DPHI could be achieved it might be more 
difficult to ensure sustainable usage (Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010). This can be 
explained, among others, by individuals getting accustomed to the benefits of the 
public good and ignoring the need for continued cooperation to maintain those 
benefits (Siegal et al., 2009). As Fischbacher & Gächter (2010) point out, it could 
well be that people tend to contribute less than their neighbors so that cooperation 
breaks down in the long run. As illustrated by Herrmann et al. (2008), there might 
also be a tendency to punish those who voluntarily contribute to the public good 
that could provoke cooperation failure. They show that this might be associated with 
a weak institutional framework so that sustainable DPHI participation might be 
especially difficult to establish in many developing countries.  
4.1.2. Trust 
The adoption of DPHIs also depends on an individual’s trust in other 
individuals, institutions, science, and technology. One can generally define trust as a 
person’s willingness to put own – material or immaterial – resources under the control 
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of another party with the expectation that this act will be beneficial for the trusting 
person but without any legal guarantee that this expectation will be met by the 
entrusted party (Fehr, 2009). From a psychological perspective, trust is often 
described as a heuristic which facilitates complex decision-making processes in 
situations which are characterized by uncertainty, such as when an individual lacks 
expertise in a topic in question (Liu et al., 2019). Survey evidence suggests 
considerable heterogeneity in levels of trust across countries, regions and demographic 
groups (Algan & Cahuc, 2013). According to Fehr (2009), trust is determined by risk 
preferences, social preferences (e.g. betrayal aversion or altruism) and beliefs or 
perceptions about other individuals’ trustworthiness. While risk and social 
preferences are mostly, at least in the short run, exogenous, the beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of other people are endogenous. They are shaped by the past 
experiences an individual has had and the type and stability of formal and informal 
institutions like civil liberties or the rule of law.  
The prevailing level of trust within the target population could affect the 
participation in DPHIs in several ways. First, higher trust in others might increase 
the willingness to cooperate in public good provision since it leads to the expectation 
of reciprocal behavior by others and thereby increases the expected benefits from 
participation (Gächter et al., 2004). Second, trust towards scientists, the media, the 
government and public health authorities can affect whether people perceive the 
DPHI as necessary and efficient (Cummings, 2014). It influences the formation of 
expectations about the private and public benefits of the intervention can thereby 
increase an individual’s self-interest and altruistic motivation to participate. Trust in 
the parties involved in implementing DPHIs could also decrease the perceived costs 
of participation when it reduces concerns about aspects like privacy invasion 
(Vaithianathan et al., 2020). Third, trust in the technology on which the DPHI is 
based can reduce the perceived costs of adoption (Eiser et al., 2002).  
Empirical evidence on the role of trust in public good contributions suggests 
that it might be of importance for fostering participation in DPHIs. Gächter et al. 
(2004) find that the correlation between socioeconomic characteristics and 
cooperation behavior in public-goods games is mainly driven by how an individual’s 
socioeconomic background shapes trust attitudes. Trust is in turn positively 
correlated with the willingness to contribute. A variety of empirical studies emphasize 
the importance of trust in public health settings (Weerd et al., 2011; Blair et al., 
2017). More recent evidence comes from the analysis of behavior during the SARS-
CoV-2 pandemic. Bargain & Aminjonov (2020) use surveys on political trust across 
European regions and data on regional mobility patterns during the outbreak of the 
pandemic in Europe. They find that higher levels of trust in political authorities are 
associated with higher compliance to public health measures such as lockdowns and 
social distancing orders. They observe that increasing the stringency of pandemic 
control measures is more efficient in regions with high political trust. These results 
might be driven by individuals expecting higher personal and societal benefits from 
compliance when they trust authorities that the measures are necessary and efficient. 
Brodeur et al. (2020) find similar results for the US. They show that the effect of 
trust on compliance seems to be driven by trust in the media. In a related study, 
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Borgonovi & Andrieu (2020) finds that people in US counties with a high degree of 
“social capital” such as trust in others – even though characterized by larger and 
denser social networks – reduce mobility more in response to the rise of COVID-19 
even before official government measures mandate social distancing.  
Not only trust in others but also trust received by others might matter for the 
decision to participate in DPHIs. Trust has been suggested to be self-reinforcing 
(Fehr, 2009) and to signal social norms (Sliwka, 2007). An entrusted individual might 
therefore under certain circumstances be more motivated to participate in a DPHI 
than an individual which experiences force or monitoring. 
4.1.3. Misperceptions 
Misperceptions have the potential to significantly affect the assessment of the 
costs and benefits of a DPHI and thereby to influence participation decisions. Nyhan 
(2020) defines misperceptions as beliefs in claims which are objectively false or 
unsupported by evidence. Evidence from experiments (Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010) 
suggests that beliefs can affect the decision to contribute to public goods. 
Misperceptions could similarly influence public support for DPHIs. Indeed, recent 
empirical evidence from lab experiments and observational studies suggests that 
misperceptions influence the reception of traditional public health interventions to 
contain the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. For instance, Akesson et al. (2020) observe in 
lab experiments that beliefs on the infectiousness of the virus can be miscalibrated 
and can influence the willingness to take social distancing measures. Similarly, Allcott 
et al. (2020) and Simonov et al. (2020) find in observational studies that compliance 
with public health policy measures shows partisan differences and that news reports 
contradicting recommendations by public health authorities reduce social distancing 
compliance. The importance of communication, expectation and belief formation is 
also stressed by Briscese et al. (2020), which study the effect of public health policy 
announcements on  social distancing compliance. These studies confirm evidence on 
the importance of beliefs in public health interventions more generally. For instance, 
beliefs which associate vaccines against measles, mumps and rubella with the 
occurrence of autism – even though not based on systematic evidence and contested 
by several scientific studies – have had a significant negative impact on vaccination 
rates, resulting in measles outbreaks in several countries (Swire-Thompson & Lazer, 
2020). Social media might foster the adoption of such misperceptions (Johnson et al., 
2020). 
Misperceptions originate either from an individual’s cognitive processes or from 
social dynamics influencing these processes. One obvious source of misperceptions 
are cognitive biases. For instance, Lammers et al. (2020) document an exponential 
growth bias, a widespread tendency among study participants to incorrectly estimate 
the growth of SARS-CoV-2 infections in linear terms instead of exponential terms. 
They link this misperception to participant’s low appreciation of social distancing 
measures. Similarly, Bavel et al. (2020) suggest that optimism bias – a tendency to 
view one’s own risk for being negatively affected to be lower than that of others – 
can result in carelessness in protecting oneself against infections. Besides biases, 
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misperceptions can also result from the application of common heuristics. One such 
heuristic might be, for instance, that events with particularly serious consequences 
also need to have a cause that is proportionately large (Bavel et al., 2020). This 
makes conspiracy theories appealing to explain terrorist attacks or large-scale public 
health threats. Another heuristic, the so-called majority illusion, can lead individuals 
to assume that the beliefs held by their close social environment are representative 
of the beliefs within the general population (Zhang & Centola, 2019). An even simpler 
heuristic is, that individuals might assume that information coming from sources 
they trust is accurate without further analyzing or questioning it (Nyhan, 2020). The 
extent to which these biases and heuristics as well as other origins of an individual’s 
misperceptions matter in practice is an active area of research. 
The social dynamics leading to misperceptions and to their wider spread are 
also a largely open area of research. The most relevant active line of research focuses 
on the spread of false information, which might lead to misperceptions. The spreading 
of false information can be intentional, e.g. in order to gain or keep political power 
or economic profit, or unintentional or even well-intended. Generally, information 
diffusion requires both information provision and information search and 
consumption. Information spreads either directly via large broadcasts, such as news 
media, or through word-of-mouth within a social network in the form of information 
cascades. The internet plays an important role in the information flow concerning 
health issues2 and potentially also for the spread of false information, which might 
lead to factually false beliefs. Recent research has particularly focused on online social 
networks. Vosoughi et al. (2018) analyze 126,000 stories on Twitter, shared 4.5 million 
times in total, with regard to the correctness of their content. They find that false 
information spreads on average faster and farther than correct information, especially 
when related to politics. They suggest that this finding might be explained by false 
information being on average more novel and appealing to different emotions than 
true information, which might encourage sharing. However, Goel et al. (2016) show 
that large information cascades are generally rare on Twitter. Direct broadcasts from 
large information sources like media outlets or influential people account for the 
majority of far-reaching content. Grinberg et al. (2019) report that in a sample of 
more than 16,000 Twitter accounts only 0.1 percent of the accounts were responsible 
for about 80 percent of the shares from media sources associated with systematic 
false information. Theoretical models on information diffusion show that the 
dynamics of the spread of information strongly depends on the topology of the 
network (Kreindler & Young, 2014). It is therefore difficult to generalize from one 
online social network to another. However, this first empirical evidence suggests, that 
understanding and making use of the dynamics of information diffusion are a central 
building block to avoiding misperceptions about public health interventions. 
                                                          
2 In 2012, 72 percent of adult US-Americans reported that they had searched online for health-related 
information within the past year (Fox & Duggan, 2013). This will probably have increased since then. 
Indeed, during the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, reports of the first case of an infection in 
an US state were on average associated with a 36 percent increase in online searches on Google for 
information about the virus the following day (Bento et al., 2020). 
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4.1.4. Information avoidance 
The decision to participate in DPHIs could be detrimentally affected by peoples’ 
tendency to actively avoid receiving and processing certain information. Evidence 
collected in the context of health suggests, that even if information is available for 
free or at relatively low cost, individuals might wish to remain ignorant out of 
strategic considerations or because they directly derive utility from holding certain 
beliefs (Golman et al., 2017; Ho et al., 2020). For instance, Oster et al. (2013) 
document that over a course of ten years out of 1,001 individuals with a 50 percent 
or higher risk for having inherited Huntington’s disease only about 5 percent took a 
perfectly predictive test before developing symptoms. The authors explain their 
finding by a model in which individuals receive direct anticipatory utility from beliefs 
about their future. Weighing the direct utility from preserving optimistic beliefs 
about the future against the potential future costs of making suboptimal decisions 
based on these beliefs they might in many cases opt for information avoidance and 
not get tested. Similarly, Ganguly & Tasoff (2017) show that 5.2 percent of the 
college students in their sample are willing to forgo 10 US-Dollars in order to not get 
tested for the herpes virus HSV-1 and even three times as many avoid getting tested 
for the as more consequential perceived HSV-2 despite financial incentives. This 
decision can be seen as a refusal to contribute to the public good of infectious disease 
control. The authors argue that the demand for information declines with decreasing 
expected consumption utility of the experience the information is about. Ho et al. 
(2020) observe that preferences for avoiding information are a stable trait within 
people but not easily predictable by demographic characteristics. 
In the context of DPHIs, this could mean that individuals might actively avoid 
the potential costs that are attached to information provided by DPHIs by not 
participating. Information provision is at the focus of many DPHIs. Receiving this 
information can potentially involve considerable hedonic costs when beliefs about 
one’s health status, behavior or risks – that directly enter into the utility function - 
have to be updated in a negative way. This might be the case, for instance, when an 
individual learns via digital contact tracing that she is at risk for having contracted 
a disease or when an app that aims at improving one’s health behavior puts the 
current lifestyle into question. 
4.2. Issues specific to public health interventions 
4.2.1. Conditionality on the personal and public health situation 
An individual’s willingness to participate in public health interventions depends 
on her perception about their relevance. Those perceptions are in turn – at least 
partially – shaped by the current state of public health and the individual health and 
risk status. To notice a need for action is a prerequisite for an individual to expect 
benefits from participating in public health interventions. This need for action 
becomes obvious when individual and public health outcomes are at risk, for instance 
during a pandemic. The expected individual benefits from participating in an 
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intervention like a vaccination campaign increase with the perceived individual 
susceptibility to the health threat and the perceived severity of the health threat 
(Weerd et al. (2011); Engle et al. (2020)). An increasing prevalence of the adverse 
health outcome (e.g. infections with a transmittable disease) within a society and 
individual risk factors (e.g. having physical contact with infected individuals) can 
increase individual’s perceived susceptibility. Observing the number of very severe 
outcomes (e.g. the number of deaths from the disease) and assessing one’s individual 
vulnerability (e.g. based on age or current health status) shapes perceptions about 
health threat severity. Even when interventions have little private benefits, observing 
the severity of the threat and others’ vulnerability might still alter altruistic 
individual’s benefits from intervention participation. 
Confirming this view, several studies find that local case numbers and the share 
of more vulnerable people are positively correlated with the compliance with public 
health measures like social distancing during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic (Engle et 
al., 2020; Brzezinski et al., 2020). Causality is difficult to assess in these cases, but it 
seems plausible that a deteriorating public health situation and a high individual 
vulnerability increase the expected benefits from public health interventions and the 
support for them. However, Akesson et al. (2020) collect evidence that opposes this 
view. They observe a fatalism effect in an experiment conducted among more than 
3,600 people. This effect refers to the observation that beliefs about higher 
infectiousness of SARS-CoV-2 are associated with decreasing willingness to comply 
with measures to contain the spread of the virus. People seem to perceive 
interventions as not effective due to the high perceived general risk. In terms of a 
cost-benefits assessment, this decreases their expected benefits from participation. 
It is important to note, that the conditionality of participation in public health 
interventions on the personal and public health situation is based on an individual’s 
perception of the situation and not necessarily on objective facts. This ties into the 
previous discussion on misperceptions. 
4.2.2. Integration of interventions into the wider health system 
The integration of DPHIs into the wider health system can raise the individual 
and public benefits from an intervention and reduce the costs of participation. TPHIs 
and DPHIs are often implemented as vertical ‘stand-alone’ interventions that only 
tackle one specific public health problem and are not viewed within the broader 
context of the health system. While this might be necessary in some cases - like the 
immediately needed response to a crisis like a pandemic – a more horizontal approach 
with the integration into the broader system is in general more efficient – from a 
supply as well as a demand perspective (Atun et al., 2010; Mehl & Labrique, 2014; 
Budd et al., 2020). Embedding an intervention into the structures of health system 
governance, resource planning, communication, clinical care, research and regulation, 
among others, ensures that resources are allocated smoothly and to those in need 
and that interventions are monitored and complemented by other measures (Mehl & 
Labrique, 2014). For instance, aggregated data collected during interventions can 
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help to improve the health system in other areas and inform research (Gong et al., 
2020).  
Furthermore, the integration of different interventions can also decrease the costs 
of participation by increasing convenience and facilitating access. In the context of 
DPHIs, one public health app might serve multiple purposes, such as public health 
communication, support of health-related behavioral changes, keeping track of 
vaccinations and symptoms reporting for infectious diseases. Health insurers could 
get involved and offer bonus programs for sustainable app usage. Local physicians 
could raise their client’s attention to the app during routine encounters. Adjusting 
such an app to social norms and cultural values might further increase its acceptance 
(Arakpogun et al., 2020). While integration of different interventions might 
significantly reduce the individual and public costs and increase their benefits, it 
might also raise new issues, for instance, if a badly-received intervention has negative 
effects on the adoption of other interventions. 
4.2.3. Credence good issues 
Information asymmetries between providers and the target population are a 
common issue with public health interventions and can substantially decrease 
participation. Markets which require expert diagnosis and treatment – like markets 
for medical goods and services – are often characterized by credence good issues. 
Only the provider of the good or service can really assess – based on expert knowledge 
– which treatment and which quality of that treatment a client needs. Whether the 
provider’s choice was reasonable and led to efficient outcomes cannot be observed by 
the client even after the treatment (Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006). Many public 
health interventions therefore have characteristics of credence goods. For instance, a 
layman is not able to assess the efficacy of a new vaccine in providing him with 
immunity as long as he does not get infected with the respective disease. Similarly, 
users of digital contact tracing applications cannot directly observe whether they 
really receive warnings on the basis of a reasonable risk of infection nor can they 
observe whether their data is potentially used for purposes besides public health 
(Vaithianathan et al., 2020). In terms of an individual’s cost-benefit calculation, 
information asymmetries related to public health interventions can lead to increased 
perceived private risks and costs and decreased perceived private and public benefits 
and can thereby reduce participation rates. 
Whether worries about exploitation are justified obviously depends on the 
implementation of a particular public health intervention. Most of the times, public 
health interventions should not involve strong financial incentives for fraud. However, 
potential participants might still be worried about other aspects like data collection 
and government surveillance that could motivate interventions (Vaithianathan et al., 
2020). False information could play a role in reinforcing those worries (Bavel et al., 
2020). The credence good character of DPHIs might especially raise the perceived 
costs of those with a low socioeconomic status as they have been found to be on 
average more often exploited in credence good situations and therefore might be 
particularly suspicious (Gottschalk et al., 2020).  
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In order alleviate such worries, measures to build trust, transparency and 
accountability should be part of the implementation of public health interventions. 
This is easier to achieve if the general trust in science, public health authorities and 
experts is high, such that individuals trust the authorities’ and experts’ judgements 
in situations where they cannot assess the value of an intervention themselves 
(Cummings, 2014). Liability and accountability of experts for their actions has been 
found to increase efficiency in credence good situations, especially when the risk of 
undertreatment is present (Dulleck et al., 2011). Transparency and a comprehensible 
scientific evaluation of interventions can also reduce uncertainty and perceived risks 
and thereby increase the willingness to participate in interventions (Vaithianathan et 
al., 2020).  
4.3. Issues specific to the digital realm 
4.3.1. Privacy concerns 
Many DPHIs rely on personal data in order to improve the health system and 
collective health outcomes3, which often raises privacy concerns among potential 
participants. The revelation of personal health data to other parties can involve risks 
and costs for individuals like the discrimination from one’s social contacts, (potential) 
employers or health insurers. Firms can use personal data for price discrimination 
and targeted advertising and criminals can use it for blackmailing and identity theft 
(Acquisti et al., 2016). Being aware of the unintended disclosure of information to 
others can also result in anxiety and mental distress and, even without significant 
consequences, the loss of privacy involves costs in itself (Price & Cohen, 2019). These 
concerns are reinforced by reports about data leaks and opportunities to identify 
people in datasets that were deemed as anonymous. This is facilitated by advances 
in techniques like machine learning and the growing possibility of combining different 
easily accessible datasets in order to re-identify certain individuals within them 
(Ohm, 2009). Rocher et al. (2019) estimate that based on 15 demographic 
characteristics 99.98% of the US-American population could be re-identified in 
datasets deemed to be anonymous. This finding puts into question traditional 
techniques of de-identification. Even data that is assumed to be safe from re-
identification at present might not remain safe in the future with technological 
advancements and the availability of complementary datasets. 
Decisions over the level of privacy always involve a trade-off between the costs 
and risks of sharing personal data and the associated benefits. On the one hand, in 
the context of public health, where personal data can contribute to research or 
                                                          
3 For example, the idea of storing a patient’s comprehensive health-related information in electronic 
medical records (EMRs) to make it easily accessible and transparent to all involved parties promises 
great efficiency increases and improvements in the safety of medical treatments (Acquisti et al., 2016). 
Biobanks use big datasets of matched phenotypic and genotypic information of individuals in order 
analyze patterns in the occurrence of certain diseases and the susceptibility to treatment methods. They 
thereby contribute to the development of precision medicine (Kohane & Altman, 2005). Observations 
of online search patterns have been used to predict influenza outbreaks and digital contact tracing is 
proposed to control the current Sars-CoV-2 pandemic (Budd et al., 2020). 
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infectious disease control and thereby to improvements in collective health outcomes, 
privacy is weighed against a public good (Buzzell, 2020). On the other hand, as 
pointed out by Fairfield & Engel (2015), privacy itself can be viewed as a public 
good. The disclosure of personal information does not only involve private costs but 
also exerts negative externalities on others. One’s personal information could also 
reveal information about people associated to him (like the health risks of family 
members based on a genetic predisposition). And in a broader context each personal 
information added to a dataset increases the opportunities to identify patterns in 
data and potentially discriminate based on these patterns. Privacy is therefore to 
some extent non-excludable and non-rivalrous in consumption. This also applies to 
general standards for data protection. This turns the participation decision in DPHIs 
into the social choice between two public goods. Abowd & Schmutte (2019) provide 
an economic model for this choice, according to which the optimal level of privacy 
protection is chosen where the marginal social benefits equal the marginal social costs 
of privacy protection in terms of lower data accuracy and representativeness. DPHIs 
need to address this tradeoff in order to maximize participation in such interventions. 
Stated and revealed preferences for privacy are oftentimes strongly at odds. In 
general, stated preferences for privacy and the protection of personal data are strong 
(Acquisti et al., 2016). This also becomes visible with regard to digital contact tracing 
during the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. For example, Altmann et al. (2020) 
document that privacy concerns are the prevailing motive for a decision not to 
participate in digital contact tracing. However, evidence from real world observations 
is often at odds with these stated preferences for privacy. For instance, participants 
in an experiment conducted by Savage & Waldmann (2015) are only willing to pay 
4.05 US-Dollar for a mobile app to hinder it from accessing their contacts and only 
1.19 US-Dollar to prevent access to their location data. Similarly, Athey et al. (2017) 
who find in an experiment among students, that even a small incentive like a pizza 
significantly increases the probability that students would share their friends’ contact 
data. The difference between strong stated preferences for privacy and often relatively 
weak revealed preferences has been described as the “privacy paradox”. 
Acquisti et al. (2015) suggest that the privacy paradox might be explained by 
the uncertainty, context dependence and the potential for malleability involved in 
decisions over privacy protection. First, privacy decisions often have to be made in a 
context of significant uncertainty. Individuals remain uncertain about whether their 
data is collected, which data is collected, by whom and for which purposes. This 
uncertainty is accompanied by uncertainty about one’s own privacy preferences. 
People express strong preferences for privacy but in concrete situations often seem 
to be unsure about their real valuation for it. Second, privacy behavior seems to be 
highly context-dependent. Preferences stated about general attitudes and the 
concrete behavior in a certain situation do not need to be closely associated (Acquisti 
et al., 2016). Even emotions regarding one’s physical environment might shape it. 
Third, privacy behavior is found to often be easily malleable, for instance, by 
changing decision frames or changing the ordering and default of options. False 
information might play an especially important role in this context. This malleability 
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also emphasizes the context-dependence and uncertainty associated with privacy 
decisions (Acquisti et al., 2015). 
Experimental evidence suggests that people’s decisions in the realm of privacy 
cannot be explained by a purely rational cost-benefit calculus. For instance, Acquisti 
et al. (2013) document the context-dependence and inconsistency of privacy decisions 
by showing that people are more willing to exchange their personal data for money 
when they thought that it was not protected by default opposed to when they 
assumed it to already be protected. They also find evidence for the malleability of 
privacy decisions, with the order of decision choices influencing privacy choices, a 
result confirmed by Athey et al. (2017). Experimental evidence by Marreiros et al. 
(2017) points to people’s uncertainty about their own privacy preferences by showing 
that even information about positive changes to a company’s privacy policy reduces 
the willingness to disclose personal data. This is interpreted as evidence for people’s 
attention being drawn to the topic of privacy by making them think about it and 
thereby reminding them of their preferences. This result is in contrast to the finding 
by Athey et al. (2017) who document that even irrelevant positive information about 
data protection increases the willingness to share data. An experiment documented 
by Adjerid et al. (2018) highlights that people’s hypothetical privacy behavior – as 
stated in surveys – is strongly influenced by the objective privacy risk while in actual 
decisions behavioral factors like reference dependence (e.g. dependence on the privacy 
settings in the period before) play a more central role.  
These results demonstrate that general concerns over privacy do not necessarily 
need to translate into low participation in DPHIs as decisions over privacy strongly 
depend on the context and the uncertainty faced. Trust might play an important 
role. On the one hand, a convincing privacy-preserving design of a DPHI can build 
trust in the implementing institutions as it signals benevolence and transparency 
(Mello & Wang, 2020). It thereby influences the future beliefs consumers have about 
the institution which might increase voluntary participation in associated 
interventions. On the other hand, trust in institutions might be a prerequisite to 
overcome privacy concerns. People often face uncertainty about whether DPHIs only 
collect and use data as they claim and whether they protect the level of privacy that 
people demand. Trust is needed in this situation of information asymmetry between 
DPHI implementers and adopters (Vaithianathan et al., 2020). Low trust in 
institutions (e.g. due to concerns over governmental surveillance) then poses a barrier 
to DPHI adoption.  
While privacy is an issue that policy-makers have to target in order to increase 
DPHI adoption, reducing privacy might also be a policy tool to foster participation 
in public good provision. Daughtey & Reinganum (2010) and Ali & Bénabou (2020) 
argue that decreased privacy and increased observability of individual actions 
involves social costs but also increases individual contributions to the public good 
due to reputational concerns. 
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4.3.2. Digital divide 
The large-scale and broad participation in DPHIs is threatened by significant 
heterogeneity across countries and across socioeconomic and demographic groups 
within countries in access and ability to use the technologies DPHIs are based on. 
Many low- and middle- income countries still have significantly lower per capita rates 
of ownership and usage of digital technologies and also lack the necessary 
infrastructure compared to wealthy countries (Arakpogun et al., 2020). Furthermore, 
even within developed countries, groups with lower socioeconomic status and of older 
age have been found to have on average less access to digital technologies and lower 
digital literacy (Aiello et al., 2020; Blom et al., 2020). For instance, in 2017, 13 
percent of the population of the European Union had never used the internet. In 
Romania, Greece and Bulgaria this share was even higher than 25 percent (European 
Commission, 2018). In the United Kingdom, less than half of the citizens older than 
65 own a smartphone (Osman et al., 2020). Access to the respective technologies and 
the skills to use them are of course prerequisites for DPHI participation before other 
considerations like those about costs and benefits come into play. 
Low participation rates of certain groups due to the digital divide impose costs 
on those groups and the general public (Kontos et al., 2014; Budd et al., 2020). 
Limited access to important public health measures and underrepresentation in 
aggregated health data is disadvantageous to the respective individuals and 
demographic and socioeconomic groups (Mello & Wang, 2020). This is particularly 
consequential since the groups with low access to digital technologies might be those 
in special need for public health interventions, such as people of older age (Blom et 
al., 2020). Furthermore, negative externalities to the general public result from the 
digital divide when public health interventions require high rates of adoption 
throughout the whole population to work efficiently (Blom et al., 2020). This stresses 
that DPHIs should be seen as complements rather than substitutes for TPHIs (Mehl 
& Labrique, 2014). 
4.3.3. Technology design and compatibility 
The design and architecture of the technology that a DPHI is based on can have 
a significant impact on the individual perceived costs of adoption and sustained 
usage. For instance, the more time a user needs to invest into getting familiar with 
the DPHI, the higher are her opportunity costs as she might use this time for other 
purposes. Opportunity costs are also increased when a DPHI poses restrictions on 
the use of other applications on the same device, for instance, when a mobile 
application increases battery usage or demands significant storage capacity (Ghose 
& Han, 2014; Redmiles, 2020). Furthermore, the design of a technology can influence 
the perceptions of its transparency and privacy features (Trang et al., 2020). 
However, one needs to consider that the objective burden of using a certain DPHI 
might be only weakly correlated with the subjective perceived costs, as suggested by 
Read (2019), who also emphasizes that there might be significant heterogeneity in 
how different demographic groups perceive the costs of using a technology. Moreover, 
it should be considered that the requirements regarding the digital literacy of users 
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and the technology a DPHI runs on can aggravate issues of the digital divide (Loi, 
2020).  
The degree of compatibility of a DPHI across already existing technological 
structures determines the associated network effects and thereby participation 
benefits (Bonardi et al., 2020). For instance, the compatibility of a mobile application 
across different smartphone operating systems increases the accessibility of the 
intervention and strengthens network effects, which increase the marginal private and 
public benefits from participation (Chen et al., 2009). 
4.4. Issues specific to innovation diffusion 
The rollout of a DPHIs has to be understood as a dynamic innovation diffusion 
process. Such processes are complex and discussed in the literature of different 
disciplines. Young (2009) categorizes the dynamics into three approaches to model 
innovation adoption: In contagion models innovations spreads like epidemics, with 
agents adopting upon contact with other agents which have already adopted an 
innovation. In social influence models agents adopt an innovation once sufficiently 
many other agents have already adopted. And in social learning models agents adopt 
innovations once they have collected sufficient evidence that an innovation is worth 
adopting, with the evidence being collected among earlier adopters. Young (2009) 
shows theoretically, that these different models lead to different adoption curves, 
which can but need not to be S-shaped as commonly observed (Griliches, 1957). 
The potentially complex dynamics of innovation diffusion also occur in the 
literature on network externalities. The adoption decision of others does not only 
signal information relevant for learning from others but also directly affects the 
benefits from adoption via network externalities (Arieli et al., 2020). Since, due to 
network effects, an individual’s benefits from a technology increase in the number of 
other users, an individual that observes an increasing number of adopters is also more 
likely to adopt based on her own cost-benefit calculus (Rohlfs, 1974). Another form 
of network externality can arise from the fact that an individual wishes to conform 
to the behavior or expectations of her social environment. Social norms are standards 
for social interactions that themselves evolve dynamically through social learning 
processes. Adhering to social norms can, for instance, signal one’s belonging to a 
certain group or affects an individual’s reputation. Not adhering to a social norm 
may result in different forms of social sanctions (Young, 2015; Arieli et al., 2020). An 
individual might therefore have strong incentives to adopt an innovation, for instance, 
to participate in digital contact tracing, when her social environment adopts it and 
it finally becomes normative to use it (Beidas et al., 2020). In the early phase when 
there are only few adopters, the lack of strong network effects or social norms favoring 
the innovation can significantly decelerate the speed of adoption of a beneficial 
innovation or might even stop it. At later stages those externalities lead to a self-
reinforcing effect that speeds up the adoption process of an innovation that has 




The speed at which innovations spread through a social network depends on a 
variety of factors like the network topology, the injection points of the innovation, 
the relative benefits of the innovation compared to the status quo and the noise in 
individual’s behavior. Young (2011) shows that social networks characterized by 
closely-intertwined local clusters foster the spread of innovations since innovations 
can first gain ground within those clusters and then spread further on. Another factor 
are the individuals through which an innovation first enters a social network. 
Banerjee et al. (2013) examine the development of the participation in microfinance 
in Indian villages. They find that the speed of diffusion is positively associated with 
the centrality of the contacts of a potential adopter. Moreover, as Young (2011) 
shows, the spread of an innovation is faster the higher the payoff of the innovation is 
compared to the status quo. Additionally, Young (2011) as well as Kreindler and 
Young (2014) find that noise in individuals’ decision-making influences diffusion 
dynamics by randomly introducing experimental adoption, which – if sufficiently high 
– can overcome initial adoption thresholds. 
Empirical evidence collected in the field suggests that addressing and 
intentionally shaping innovation diffusion processes is important to ensure 
widespread adoption. For instance, field experiments conducted by Conley & Udry 
(2010) and Beaman et al. (2018) in the context of the diffusion of agricultural 
technology in developing countries demonstrate the importance of social learning 
when people are uncertain about the benefits and costs associated with the adoption 
of an innovation. 
5. Approaches to foster participation in digital public 
health interventions 
In the following sections, we review the literature relevant to fostering 
participation in DPHIs. First, we outline the tradeoffs with making participation 
mandatory. Second, we cover issues in providing information. Third, we evaluate 
explicit incentives and nudges for adoption and usage of DPHIs. Lastly, we discuss 
how regulation and technology design can support wide-spread participation. 
5.1. Mandatory and voluntary participation 
Participation in public health interventions can be either voluntary, mandatory 
or conditionally mandatory. Under a policy of voluntary participation, individuals 
freely choose to opt in or out of the participation in a public health intervention 
without any punishment by authorities. 
Mandatory participation can arguably lead to high intervention adoption rates 
but also raises concerns. One example are mandatory vaccination policies. For 
instance, US-states require children to get vaccinated as a prerequisite for being 
admitted to public schools (Wynia, 2007; Stewart, 2009). Such policies often require 
significant monitoring to enforce compliance. Additionally, being mandated to engage 
in an intervention can lead to negative spillovers to other behaviors related to public 
health (Bonardi et al., 2020). The mandate might be perceived as a signal of the 
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authority’s distrust in the people and diminish intrinsic motivation (Gneezy et al., 
2011). In general, ethical concerns over the restrictions of civil liberties are an 
important counterargument (Mello & Wang, 2020). 
Conditionally mandatory participation is a less invasive strategy but raises 
similar ethical and practical concerns. Under this regime, people need to participate 
in the intervention in order to enter certain places or perform certain activities. For 
instance, being allowed entrance to public transport might be conditional on proving 
that one participates in digital contact tracing (Bonardi et al., 2020). This 
significantly increases the costs of non-participation. 
Balancing the costs and benefits of these different regulatory regimes prior to 
the rollout of a DPHI is inherently difficult. While political decision-makers might 
retreat to political ideology when making choices among these different regimes, a 
more fruitful approach would be to experimentally test these different regimes in 
combination with other measures to foster participation. None of the measures to 
foster participation is likely to be “silver bullet” leading to high adoption and usage. 
Rather, the path to widespread participation has to be intentionally designed, with 
different measures serving as complements or balancing off other measures’ 
weaknesses. 
5.2. Information provision 
5.2.1. Communicators and communication channels 
Not only the messages but also the messengers matter for successful provision 
of information on DPHIs. Personalities entrusted by the targeted parts of society 
could potentially be effective messengers. Due to the credence good characteristics of 
many DPHIs – lay people cannot assess the need for and efficacy of the measures 
even after adoption – it is important that those who communicate the benefits of a 
DPHI are perceived as trustworthy (Vaithianathan et al., 2020; Bavel et al., 2020). 
Several studies show that higher trust in the government and the authorities who 
communicate measures is associated with higher levels of compliance with those 
measures during public health emergencies (Blair et al., 2017; Bargain & Aminjonov, 
2020). Trustworthiness depends on past experiences (Fehr, 2009). For instance, it can 
be affected by whether the person or institution was perceived as independent, 
without conflict of interest, competent and consistent in its messages and actions in 
the past (Cummings, 2014). To foster the acceptance for public health messages, 
people should therefore hold positive beliefs about the expertise, reliability and 
benevolence of communicators based on prior experiences with them. In the US, trust 
in scientists and health professionals seems to be significantly higher than trust in 
the media and the government (Swire-Thompson & Lazer, 2020). Thus, the 
population there might be more likely to update their beliefs based on communication 
about a DPHI when this communication is directly linked to public health experts. 
First evidence on the efficacy of communication measures during the SARS-
CoV-2 pandemic and past vaccination campaigns shows that choosing trustworthy 
communicators can be helpful to increase participation in public health interventions. 
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For instance, Allcott et al. (2020) show that diverging messages by political leaders 
in the US across the political spectrum appears to have shaped beliefs and 
participation in public health measures. Alatas et al. (2019) conduct an experiment 
with Indonesian celebrities on Twitter and find evidence of a celebrity endorsement 
effect. Messages about vaccination campaigns tweeted by celebrities do not only reach 
more people due to the large number of followers but also because followers are more 
likely to share such tweets compared to those by peers. Banerjee et al. (2020) find in 
a randomized controlled trial involving 28 million Indians that sending a text message 
containing a message by a prominent and trusted person is associated with increased 
compliance to public health measures during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. This effect 
on behavior does even spill over within communities to those who did not receive 
such a message.  
Digital technologies are an important medium to spread information about 
DPHIs (Budd et al., 2020). As already pointed out, many people seek health-related 
information online (Bento et al., 2020). Websites, mobile applications and messengers 
and social media channels can therefore have a great impact in supporting the 
diffusion of information about DPHIs. Some DPHIs might even be used to foster the 
participation in other DPHIs through messaging functionalities. It might also be 
worthwhile to try to engineer viral distribution of public health information. For 
instance, referrals to DPHIs could be incentivized. 
5.2.2. Design and timing of communication 
The information provided should be transparent, ideally based on scientific 
evidence and avoid conflicting messages (Weerd et al., 2011). This can significantly 
alter people’s perceived costs and benefits of DPHIs towards a more positive 
evaluation. Additionally, trust can be built when people update their beliefs about 
the respective communicators in a positive way. To this end, information provision 
should not remain a one-way street from providers to participators but those 
designing and implementing the DPHI should also consider feedback from the 
respective communities. This provides a form of social licensing and potentially builds 
up trust in the project (Vaithianathan et al., 2020). However, when trust is a 
prerequisite for accepting messages, the efficacy even of good communication 
concepts can be limited in low-trust populations (Blair et al., 2017).  
The efficacy of an information also depends on its framing. This is an aspect 
closely related to nudging. Public health communication often emphasizes the public 
benefits of an intervention. This can appeal to people’s prosocial motives and make 
social norms salient and thereby raise perceived benefits (Bonardi et al., 2020). 
However, as shown by Wells et al. (2020), increasing the comprehension of the 
prosocial nature of an intervention in a population might not always benefit the 
intervention, depending on the degree of altruistic preferences in the population and 
the perceived risks of the intervention. Instead, the correction of misperceptions 
about the associated risks might be more helpful to ensure success. Many public 
health interventions also involve significant private benefits. This applies, for 
instance, to vaccinations against infectious diseases in the absence of herd immunity 
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or to digital contact tracing. In those cases, it might make sense to also highlight 
private benefits in order to increase participation rates (Bonardi et al., 2020). 
Providing a clear understanding of the individual benefits of a DPHI could also reach 
those who refuse participation out of information avoidance considerations (Oster et 
al., 2013). 
Communication on public health interventions should also be framed in such a 
way, that it clearly points out the severe consequences that might result from not 
addressing a public health threat. This can make the private and public benefits of 
participation more salient. For instance, events and risks are often perceived as more 
probable if they receive large-scale media coverage. This phenomenon is also referred 
to as availability heuristic (Siegal et al., 2009). However, if threats are perceived as 
overwhelming, this might trigger a fatalism effect through which the threat is 
perceived as so large that interventions are not considered to be effective and the 
willingness to participate decreases (Akesson et al., 2020). These opposing effects 
have be balanced off against each other. 
Another aspect of the framing of information is to clarify the trade-offs involved 
in the adoption of DPHIs. While interventions might involve costs like personal effort 
or privacy risks, those costs need to be presented in the context of the associated 
benefits, such as potentially saving lives and protecting the health of parts of the 
population. One way to illustrate trade-offs is to present evidence on potential 
counterfactual outcomes (Mello & Wang, 2020). Communicating public health 
measures also concerns communication on costs of an intervention, which might have 
ambiguous effects. On the one hand, presenting information on how costs are 
minimized might deem public health interventions as cost-effective. On the other 
hand, communicating costs might actually draw people’s attention to those costs and 
increase their concerns, as studies regarding individuals’ decisions over privacy reveal 
(Marreiros et al., 2017). 
Besides building trust and properly framing communication on digital public 
health interventions, the timing of communication should also be carefully chosen. 
For instance, Bento et al. (2020) show that large events associated with public health 
threats might only induce a short period of increased attention to information 
regarding the threat. This suggests that communication on DPHIs needs to be 
conducted quickly after a public health threat arises. 
Lastly, communication on DPHIs has to anticipate that the effects of 
communication are likely to be heterogeneous. How a message is perceived and 
reacted to might, for instance, depend on heterogeneous risk preferences, trust 
towards the communicator or expectations formed prior to receiving the message 
(Briscese et al., 2020; Fan et al., 2020). Digital technologies can provide a solution to 
this end by enabling to send people tailored messages based on their observable 
characteristics (Bennett & Glasgow, 2009).  
5.2.3. Addressing misperceptions 
The providers of DPHIs also need to address misperceptions and attempt to 
correct them, for instance, by counteracting the spread of false information. 
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Experimental evidence collected by Akesson et al. (2020) and Lammers et al. (2020) 
during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic suggests, that providing true information has the 
potential to correct misperceptions. However, this might not always work, especially 
when false information has been spread intentionally. Nyhan & Reifler (2010) even 
argue that the correction of misperceptions by evidence-based information can lead 
to a backfire effect and strengthen beliefs in false claims. This might be, among 
others, explained by people’s tendency to stick to claims that they are motivated to 
believe in (Levy, 2017). In his review of the related literature, Nyhan (2020) suggests 
that the backfire effect is a rather uncommon phenomenon. However, false 
information could also be countered differently. For instance, sources with verified 
information could be labeled and fact-checking services can reduce uncertainty when 
seeking advice. To this end, public authorities could cooperate with entrusted 
independent scientists, health professionals and fact-checking services. 
A more general approach to counter misperceptions about DPHIs is obviously 
to invest in media, health and digital literacy. Related education campaigns can 
increase the population’s ability to distinguish false and true claims and to critically 
question the information encountered online and offline (Swire-Thompson & Lazer, 
2020; Nyhan, 2020). Furthermore, the supply side of information leading to 
misperceptions about DPHIs might be addressed. A field experiment by Nyhan & 
Reifler (2015) finds that raising politicians’ awareness for being monitored by fact 
checkers and to the potential reputational consequences of communicating false 
information can reduce their propensity to make false claims. 
5.3. Explicit incentives 
5.3.1. Material incentives 
Monetary incentives can provide a means to increase cooperation and 
participation in DPHIs. If an individual faces private costs when contributing to the 
public good but perceives little private benefits, monetary rewards can compensate 
for the private costs and thereby increase the willingness to participate. Financial 
incentives can take different forms, such as direct payments conditional on an 
individual’s participation in a DPHI as well as fines for free riding. Both positive and 
negative incentives have been shown to increase cooperation in public good provision 
under certain circumstances (Fehr & Gächter, 2000b; Kraft-Todd et al., 2015). 
Material rewards like t-shirts or mugs, or providing free products or medical 
treatments can similarly be used as incentive devices. For instance, in areas where 
the digital divide poses significant barriers to large-scale DPHI adoption, providing 
the technology that the DPHI is based on, such as a smartphone, for free or at lower 
costs could significantly foster adoption. 
The significant costs that material incentives impose on their provider can be 
justified with the positive externalities they can generate. Strong positive 
externalities of the participation in an intervention, for instance, due to network 
effects, can substantiate incentives from a social welfare perspective (Dupas, 2014). 
In order to decrease the associated costs and increase efficiency, they could also be 
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strategically targeted at certain individuals instead of all potential participants. 
Providing incentives to people who adopt an intervention early on or are particularly 
influential within a social network can convince them of a DPHI. This, in turn, can 
generate positive spill-over effects on peers and accelerate the diffusion process. 
Similarly, referral rewards could be another tool to use the existing social network 
for advertising adoption. Kornish & Li (2010) show that the effect of a referral bonus 
of a certain height depends on how much the targeted person is concerned about the 
outcomes of her contacts. 
5.3.2. Issues with material incentives 
Even though material rewards are an intuitive way to stimulate the participation 
in DPHIs, their usage can also trigger undesirable effects which decrease their 
efficiency and can even lead to counterproductive results. One concern is that 
incentivizing DPHI adoption by material rewards might alter people’s expectations 
when people have reference-dependent preferences (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006). Their 
reference point might change such that they expect to also be compensated for 
participation in the future. This can threaten the sustained usage of a DPHI once 
the reward is no longer provided and might also exert negative spill-over effects on 
other public health interventions when the willingness to participate in them without 
compensation decreases based on past experiences of incentives (Gneezy et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, in a field experiment with subsidized health products, Dupas (2014) 
finds a positive effect of one-time subsidies via stimulated social learning and no 
negative effect of a changing reference point. 
An even bigger class of concerns for using material incentives is, that they might 
crowd out intrinsic motivation by interacting with individual’s prosocial motives and 
their concerns for their self-image and social reputation. First, the provision of an 
incentive to participate may contain a negative signal to the respective individual. It 
might, for instance, be interpreted as a signal that the authority does not trust 
individuals’ own motivation. This might reduce the motivation to participate out of 
preferences for reciprocity or more generally decrease the utility the individual 
receives from performing a benevolent task (Gneezy et al., 2011). A similar effect 
might occur when the incentive is interpreted as a signal that participation in the 
DPHI is so costly and privately unbeneficial that it needs to be incentivized (Bénabou 
& Tirole, 2003). Similarly, imposing a fine on free riding could also be interpreted as 
a signal of how costly free riding is for the society. An individual could then decide 
to simply pay the ‘price’ of not contributing and thereby distance from feelings like 
shame for non-contribution (Kranton, 2019). It should also be considered that the 
provision of referral bonuses can have adverse effects on social learning when people 
anticipate that their peer’s intrinsic motivation might have been undermined by other 
incentives and the recommendation might therefore be less credible and contain a 
weaker quality signal (Sun et al., 2020).  
Second, a material incentive can reduce the positive social signal that public 
good contributions send to those who observe them. Contributions might be 
perceived as mainly driven by self-interest when incentivized and thereby no longer 
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serve as a signal that improves others’ perceptions of the individual. Therefore, 
incentives might crowd out the motivation resulting from reputational concerns 
(Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). Ariely et al. (2009) find in an experiment that the 
introduction of monetary incentives increases anonymous donations to charity but 
has no effect on donations which are observable to others.  
Third, material incentives may change the frame within which the decision to 
participate is made. Incentives might prompt individuals to view the decision to 
participate as an economic transaction in which they maximize private utility instead 
of a social interaction to which, for instance, preferences for altruism and warm-glow 
giving apply (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012). The change from a social to a monetary 
frame might explain the experimental finding by Gneezy & Rustichini (2000), who 
show that if compensation is paid, compensation increases are associated with 
increasing performance of participants. However, those participants who receive a 
relatively low compensation perform worse than those without compensation. This 
might be explained by intrinsic motivation applying to the setting with no 
compensation and low extrinsic motivation replacing intrinsic motivation as soon as 
a small compensation is paid. 
Fourth, receiving material rewards can give individuals a feeling of being 
monitored and undermine their sense of self-determination. The decision to 
participate is no longer perceived as being made autonomously which may result in 
lower utility from taking that decision. Fifth, in the long run, preferences may be 
endogenously determined and shaped by the environment of an individual. When 
prosocial behavior is incentivized by material rewards, an individual might update 
her beliefs about the prevailing social norms and the motivation of the people around 
her. Conformist motives might then lead an individual to adopt preferences that are 
more self-interested (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012).  
A more indirect crowding out effect might result from rewards inducing sorting 
effects, where participants are not the ones who are most intrinsically motivated 
(Meyer & Tripodi, 2018). While DPHI adoption is boosted in the short run by the 
incentive, the sustained usage might decline since those who participate in a 
subsidized intervention are people who are less interested in its success than the 
people who might have otherwise been attracted. The adverse sorting effects of 
material rewards have also been observed in the commercial context (Sun et al., 
2019). Yet, depending on the expected time-frame of a DPHI, a shorter-term boost 
of participation induced by the ability of participants to sort into incentive and non-
incentive schemes might be helpful for increase the efficacy of certain interventions. 
Since material incentives and intrinsic motivation can be substitutes under 
certain circumstances, policy-makers need to consider that incentives do not only 
affect individual costs and benefits of participation but also the beliefs and 
preferences underlying the decision to participate in a DPHI. The relationship 
between an intervention provider and the target population, the information that 
incentives signal and the underlying social norms in a society need to be considered. 
To foster a more complementary character of material incentives and intrinsic 
motivation, incentives should be accompanied by messages which explain the social 
and moral frame of participation and the supportive meaning of incentives. Potential 
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adopters need to understand that their participation is essential to provide the public 
good and what the benefits associated with that public good are. Additionally, 
feedback from society, as well as the prevailing local norms and perceptions, need to 
be considered (Kranton, 2019). For instance, more civic minded societies with high 
preferences for prosocial behavior and high levels of trust might require lower material 
incentives than those with a lower level of prosocial preferences (Bowles & Polanía-
Reyes, 2012).  
Often – but not always – it might be efficient to use a lower level of incentives 
than the level that would be chosen when not considering the interaction with 
intrinsic motivation. However, when a certain critical level of participation in a DPHI 
is needed to ensure that the public good is provided, it can be optimal to choose an 
even higher level of incentives than a naïve planner to compensate for the relative 
inefficiency of incentives. This could, for instance, apply when a certain level of 
vaccination coverage has to be reached to achieve herd immunity. In such cases, the 
marginal social benefit of participation increases sharply as soon as participation falls 
under a certain threshold, justifying even very high levels of incentives (Bowles & 
Hwang, 2008). 
5.3.3. Non-material incentives 
An alternative to material rewards for participation could be the presentation 
of awards. Receiving an award can enhance one’s self-image and thereby increase 
intrinsic motivation. The crowding out effect as with material incentives is less likely 
since awards are perceived as a gesture of support and not control. Additionally, they 
can be a favorable social signal to others and thereby appeal to individual’s 
reputational concerns. From a supply-side perspective, awards are efficient since they 
do not involve major costs to their provider. However, the provider needs to be able 
to effectively restrict their supply because their value to an individual decreases with 
a growing number of the same awards being presented to others. Being short in 
supply makes awards’ signal of social distinction credible but also limits the 
scalability of this incentive scheme. Furthermore, awards require trust and acceptance 
from the recipient towards the supplier. They will not be valued when the providing 
institution is not perceived as prestigious as might be the case when individuals 
distrust public institutions (Frey, 2007).  
Assessing the causal effect of awards on motivation and performance is relatively 
difficult. Awards might foster motivation but those who are more motivated are also 
more likely to receive an award (Frey & Gallus, 2017). Gallus (2017) attempts to 
overcome this identification issue by conducting a large-scale field experiment where 
awards are randomly assigned to new contributors on Wikipedia. Even though those 
awards are purely symbolic and can only be linked to the contributor’s online 
pseudonym, they have a significant positive effect on the willingness to contribute in 
the future. Gallus (2017) explains this finding by the fact that awards increase an 
individual’s self-identification with the online community and signal social status 
within this community so that they act as a motivating device. 
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Another explicit non-material incentive can be the creation of social pressure by 
making individual contributions and also free riding visible to others. Policy-makers 
might decide to decrease individual privacy of action with regard to the participation 
in DPHIs and thereby increase the motivation out of reputational concerns. When 
concerns about how others view one’s behavior directly enter into the utility function, 
individuals might perceive increased benefits from participation when they know that 
their actions can be observed. Free riding is then associated with significant costs in 
the form of being shamed for not contributing (Daughety & Reinganum, 2010; Ali & 
Bénabou, 2020). However, a policy of decreased privacy also brings about issues of 
its own. When individuals distort their contribution behavior out of image concerns, 
this behavior becomes less meaningful to infer the underlying social preferences. This 
might decelerate the process of the formation of new social norms and the policy and 
legal change based on those norms (Ali & Bénabou, 2020). Importantly, inducing 
social pressure might also crowd out intrinsic motivation, for instance, by eroding 
the trust relationship between the authority and citizens (Gneezy et al., 2011).  
5.4. Nudges 
5.4.1. Nudges as a policy instrument 
Nudges are “features of the choice architecture that influence the decisions 
people make without changing either objective payoffs or incentives” (Thaler, 2018, 
p. 1283). Since individuals do not incur any significant costs to avoid them, nudges 
should not affect the decisions of rational individuals which are fully aware of their 
preferences and simply weigh the costs and benefits of a decision but should lead to 
better decisions of individuals which are not fully rational and rely on intuitive 
thinking or heuristics in their decision-making processes. In the case of DPHIs, non-
participation might, for instance, not be driven by the individual costs of 
participation outweighing the benefits but rather by heuristic decision-making or 
forgetfulness (Milkman et al., 2011), which might lead to individually and socially 
suboptimal outcomes. Nudges targeted to address such issues could therefore help to 
increase participation rates.  
There is no clear-cut classification of what counts as a nudge. Changing defaults, 
promoting commitment strategies, increasing the ease and convenience of certain 
decisions or changing the framing of a decision are typical examples of nudges. In 
contrast, the mere provision of information in situations of uncertainty is arguably 
not a nudge since it would also alter the decisions of fully rational individuals. 
Similarly, building up social pressure by decreasing privacy of actions can arguably 
not count as a nudge since decreasing privacy might be seen as some form of force 
and social pressure might be strong enough to considerably change the choice options 
available to people (Schubert, 2017). 
Nudges are an appealing policy instrument since they are usually associated 
with low implementation costs, do not require laborious monitoring – as with bans 
or taxes – and are perceived as less invasive than other measures since they do not 
restrict individual’s options or alter the costs and benefits of certain decisions 
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(Bhargava & Loewenstein, 2015; Capraro et al., 2019). Therefore, nudges can be 
considered to be an instrument for libertarian paternalism, which aims at changing 
people’s behaviors to what is perceived as being in their own best interest, without 
restricting the freedom of choice. This contrasts with heavy-handed paternalism, 
which operates with mandates, restrictions and changing economic incentives (e.g. 
taxes and subsidies) to achieve improvements in what is perceived as the people’s 
own interest. It should, however, be mentioned that nudges in the context of public 
good provision are often non-paternalistic, meaning that they do not aim to increase 
every single individual’s utility but aim at the welfare of the overall society (Schubert, 
2017). 
5.4.2. Evidence on the effects of nudges 
Nudges have been implemented in many forms, for instance in the areas of health 
and environmental protection. Some empirical results suggest positive effects of 
nudging on people’s decisions to contribute to public goods. A prominent example of 
nudging is the change in defaults in participation decisions. If participation is seen 
as desirable – as in the case of DPHIs, or, in general, in public good provision – 
policy-makers can make participation the default option such that individuals have 
to actively opt out in order not to participate. To count as a nudge, of course, no 
significant barriers or costs should be associated with opting out (Bonardi et al., 
2020). Johnson & Goldstein (2003) show for a sample of European countries that the 
rate of people consenting to organ donation is between 85 and almost 100 percent in 
countries where this is the default option, whereas the rate is lower than 30 percent 
in countries where an active opt-in is necessary. This seems to lead to significantly 
higher organ donation rates in countries with a default choice to opt in. The impact 
of a default nudge might be explained by several factors. First, people might perceive 
the default as a recommendation, as a preferable option chosen by the policy-maker 
or reflecting social norms that guides decision in complex and uncertain contexts 
(Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). Second, consumers might exhibit inertia and a bias 
towards the status quo since they prefer to avoid making active decisions that might 
involve effort and cognitive or emotional costs when trade-offs are faced. Third, 
people may perceive the default as a reference point. Deviations from this point 
involve losses due to the associated trade-offs (like the trade-off between contributing 
to the common good of organ donation and suspicion about the practice of organ 
donation). Loss aversion – a tendency to weigh losses more than equivalent gains – 
can then lead people to stick with the default option (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; 
Schubert, 2017). Setting a default might be seen as one way of framing a decision. 
Other ways of framing, for instance, changing the order of options or presenting 
a trade-off in terms of losses or gains, can also significantly affect decisions. 
Martinsson et al. (2019) provide an example in a public goods game. They find that 
cooperation is significantly higher when contributions are framed as giving to the 
public good, compared to not taking from the public good. Other experiments 
confirm the effects of framing (Andreoni, 1995b; Acquisti et al., 2013). Depending on 
the nature of the framing, the results could possibly be explained by similar factors 
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like those at play in the case of defaults, for instance, loss aversion and inertia 
(Acquisti et al., 2013; Michalek & Schwarze, 2020).  
Reminders and implementation intention prompts are another class of nudges, 
which has been shown to work in real-world settings. Yokum et al. (2018) find that 
sending letters to remind people to get vaccinated against influenza had a significant 
positive impact on vaccination rates among 228,000 people in a randomized 
controlled trial. However, relative to informational or motivational letters, they find 
no additional positive effect of implementation intention prompts, i.e. letters that 
non-bindingly asked people to write down the date and time when they plan to get 
the influenza vaccination. This contrasts a finding from a field experiment by 
Milkman et al. (2011) in which receiving an implementation intention prompt had a 
significant positive effect on vaccination rates relative to informational reminders. As 
the authors point out, implementation intention prompts might help people to 
overcome procrastination and forgetfulness by making concrete plans that link their 
initial intentions to actions. 
Shifting the focus from individual decision-makers to cooperative decision-
making, social nudges try to make use of the observation, that many people cooperate 
conditional on others’ cooperation in public goods games (Frey & Meier, 2004). They 
might therefore be motivated to cooperate when information about the share of other 
people that cooperate and the amount of their contributions is – in a non-identifiable 
manner – disclosed, given that others have cooperated to a significant extend 
(Michalek & Schwarze, 2020). From a theoretical standpoint, it is not trivial that 
people are conditional contributors. On the one hand, if the main motivation for 
public good contributions is altruism, own and others’ contributions could be 
substitutes. The more others contribute, the more increases other people’s utility 
from the public good so that the marginal effect of a person’s contribution on others’ 
utility, about which she cares, decreases. On the other hand, others’ and own 
contributions can be complements when preferences for reciprocity play a main role, 
when others’ contributions are seen as signaling a social norm to which one wants to 
conform or when people use simple heuristics that suggest them to imitate others’ 
behavior (Shang & Croson, 2009; Schubert, 2017). Empirical evidence appears to 
confirm the second view, i.e. people increase public good contributions when they are 
informed that others contributed and even when others non-bindingly announce that 
they will contribute (Frey & Meier, 2004; Kessler, 2017). However, it should also be 
noted that people may tend to contribute at a lower level than the ones they observe 
(Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010).  
Building on conformity motives and prosocial preferences, a policy-maker can 
also use nudges to make social norms or the general moral aspects of a decision more 
salient. Capraro et al. (2019) use a simple question to prompt individuals to think 
about the moral dimension of their actions before they participate in an economic 
game. They show that this moral nudge significantly increases prosocial and 
cooperative behavior and that this effect also spills over to other contexts. Barron & 
Nurminen (2020) give a share of the participants in their public goods game the 
information that a certain level of contribution is viewed as ‘good’ or desirable from 
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a social perspective. Providing such a reference point to individuals has a significant 
positive effect on their contributions to the public good.  
Another way of nudging people towards public good contribution can be to 
disclose the (negative) consequences of their past behavior or to make those more 
salient, for instance, by using simplified descriptions and depictions. An experiment 
by Butler et al. (2020) shows how giving public feedback on past community behavior 
via a mascot that expresses respective emotions or via simple visualization of the 
respective data can increase people’s prosocial behavior compared to the mere 
provision of the respective data in a private setting.  
5.4.3. Issues with nudges 
Not all nudges have the intended effects. In certain contexts, they been shown 
to be relatively ineffective or to even have negative side-effects. For instance, Goette 
& Tripodi (2020) provide blood donors with positive feedback on the use of their 
past donations in order to increase their intrinsic motivation. Contrary to what might 
be expected, the authors find that this information has a negative effect on people’s 
future blood donations. This could be explained by moral licensing. People derive 
utility from positive beliefs about themselves and therefore invest in their identity by 
behaving prosocial and moral. When they are reminded that they acted morally in 
the past and update their beliefs such that they are a moral person already, 
investments in their own identity will pay off less and they might feel less urged to 
act morally again in the nearer future (Bénabou & Tirole, 2011). Goette & Tripodi 
(2020) find that attaching an explicit appeal to donate blood again to the feedback 
can help to overcome the negative consequences of moral licensing but does not 
induce an overall positive effect of the nudge.  
Another issue that has been highlighted is that in some cases nudges and 
traditional policy tools can act as substitutes since the use of nudges crowds out 
support for more invasive but also more effective measures. Hagmann et al. (2019) 
find support for this assumption by conducting several experiments. They document 
that respondents are less likely to support a carbon tax when they are provided with 
the alternative of implementing a default nudge aimed at choosing renewable energy 
supply. Similarly, the support for increasing social security contributions was partially 
crowded out by the possibility to implement a nudge regarding retirement savings 
plans. Also in this case, moral licensing might provide an explanation for this finding. 
People update their beliefs such that they are a moral person when choosing the 
nudge and do not feel the need to support policies that impose higher costs on them. 
However, Hagmann et al. (2019) show that such a crowding out effect can be 
prevented by correcting people’s beliefs about the effectiveness of both policy tools 
before they take the decision. 
Furthermore, an often articulated concern is that the use of nudges as policy 
tools might be unethical. First, paternalism assumes that the policy-maker can figure 
out what is in an individual’s or in the wider society’s best interest. However, in 
many circumstances, it is difficult to assess what maximizes other an individual’s or 
society’s utility. Additionally, policy-makers – especially in countries with unstable 
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or undemocratic institutions – do not always act on behalf of the people (Schubert, 
2017; Engelen, 2019).  
Second, nudges operate on the basis of people’s cognitive and behavioral biases, 
often without people noticing the impact of those nudges. This might be perceived 
as nontransparent and manipulative. Paternalistic and non-paternalistic approaches 
might be perceived to undermine and disrespect individual’s autonomy (Engelen, 
2019). If people feel manipulated, this can backfire by reducing their trust in 
institutions – a trust that is needed for interventions to be accepted. The destruction 
of the trust relationship between people and policy-makers can also crowd out 
intrinsic motivations to participate in public good provision (Gneezy et al., 2011). 
Reactance – a psychological defense reaction to the perception that one’s freedom is 
at threat – might even lead to behaviors contrary to what the nudge intended (Bruns 
et al., 2018).  
Third, nudges may affect preference formation, social learning, and policy 
development processes by manipulating people’s behavior. They might crowd out 
policies that focus on the structural reasons for suboptimal outcomes and might make 
people’s behavior less informative for policy-makers to observe changing social norms 
and preferences (Bhargava & Loewenstein, 2015; Schubert, 2017). Fourth, nudges 
may have redistributive effects and under some circumstances disproportionately 
affect those with a lower socioeconomic status (Ghesla et al., 2020).  
One way to tackle some of those issues could be by making nudges, their 
intentions and impacts, more transparent and thereby diminishing concerns over 
subtle manipulation. For instance, Bruns et al. (2018) show in a laboratory 
experiment that the positive impact a default nudge has on contributions to the 
reduction of carbon emissions does not decrease when people are transparently 
informed about the features of the nudge before making their contribution decision. 
It should also be considered that different types of nudges vary in the degree of how 
strongly they change people’s choice architecture and try to guide choices in a certain 
direction. Simply providing information about the share of other people who 
contribute might in this regard be perceived as less invasive and questionable than 
changing defaults, for instance (Patel, 2018).  
Another way to address ethical issues with nudges is to provide nudges to reason, 
as suggested by Levy (2017). These nudges do not aim at exploiting people’s cognitive 
and behavioral biases but instead try to foster their critical thinking and 
responsiveness to best evidence. One could, for instance, frame best scientific 
evidence in a way such that it becomes more salient or have it presented by people 
who are perceived as credible by the targeted population. This way it becomes easier 
for this group to question own misperceptions and make responsible and well-
informed decisions. 
Finally, nudges might be more acceptable if their implementation is guided by 
ethical principles, for instance, by weighing the costs and the potential benefits of 
their introduction beforehand by parliament or other representative committees. The 
use of nudges might, for instance, be easier to justify in situations of a large public 
health threat. If a reliable mechanism to collectively decide on such justifications is 




Consistent and transparent regulation can help to build trust in DPHIs and 
those who provide them and decrease the perceived risks of participation. Policy-
makers should consider to bind themselves by clear rules and monitoring when 
implementing DPHIs (Mello & Wang, 2020; Amit et al., 2020). This helps to ensure 
and signal to the public that the adoption of DPHIs is in line with the principle of 
proportionality. Furthermore, such interventions should be appropriate given the 
targeted public health goal and should be the minimally invasive means to achieve 
that goal (Ienca & Vayena, 2020). Legal guidelines can prescribe a maximum period 
of operation for a DPHI with subsequent data deletion when the DPHI is a response 
to an acute crisis. The scope and purpose of the collected personal data, the 
institutions having access to that data and the technological approach to data 
anonymization could be transparently determined within a legal contract. 
Compliance to such a contract might be monitored by an independent committee 
constituted by experts, among others, from law and ethics, and representatives of the 
wider public. This committee might require regular reporting by the providers of 
DPHIs, conduct data audits and the like (Price & Cohen, 2019; Amit et al., 2020). 
As a consequence, individual’s concerns about the misuse of their data or 
unconstrained government surveillance might be mitigated which reduces the 
perceived costs of DPHI participation. To this end it is important to clearly 
communicate the purpose of regulations and put them into context so that their 
benefits are recognized and understood by the population. 
More generally, a transparent and well-developed legal framework for privacy 
protection can help to mitigate related concerns. In the context of public health 
interventions, it appears to be particularly important to have a legal basis for allowing 
or prohibiting the linking of health-related data with other data sets, to impose 
significant fines on data misuse, such as the purposeful reidentification of individuals, 
and to require high standards of data protection (Kohane & Altman, 2005; Ohm, 
2009). 
Another area where regulation can play a role is the reduction of the spread of 
false information. Websites associated with systematic false information could be 
regulated or even banned. Reducing the reach of social media groups that frequently 
communicate false claims is another possible measure to increase participation in 
public health interventions such as vaccinations or digital contact tracing. However, 
such regulations raise substantial concerns over censorship and restrictions of the 
right to freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. The proportionality of such 
regulation has to be assessed (Nyhan, 2020).  
Concerning regulations in general, it also needs to be taken into account that 
regulation which is only indirectly connected to the respective public health 
intervention might exert spillovers on people’s participation and compliance. This is 
pointed out by Lucas et al. (2020), who argue that stricter legal enforcement of self-
isolation measures for people infected with SARS-CoV-2 could be associated with a 
decreasing willingness to report an infection and to comply with contact tracing 
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measures. This could be explained by stricter regulations increasing the individual 
costs of compliance. 
5.6. Technology design 
To ensure high participation, DPHIs need to address the digital divide. In most 
countries, parts of the population does only have limited or no digital skills or lack 
the financial resources or willingness to adopt more advanced digital technologies. 
DPHIs should therefore have low requirements regarding the technology they are 
delivered through and the digital literacy needed to use them. Reducing such barriers 
to participation ensures equitable access to the intervention and contributes to 
achieving the highest possible adoption rate (Loi, 2020).  
Furthermore, the perceived costs of participation should be minimized by 
technological means as much as possible. A DPHIs needs to be of low complexity, 
convenient to use and the necessary tasks for participating in the intervention should 
be obvious, short and easy (Trang et al., 2020). To increase convenience, it can also 
be helpful to integrate several DPHIs into one technology solution - for instance, a 
universal public health app with different functions like providing health-related 
information, communicating public health alerts and enabling digital contact tracing 
(Li et al., 2020).  Since the perceived costs of using a technology might only weakly 
correspond to the objective costs, experimental tests with potential users should be 
performed in advance whenever possible, such that technology designers can take this 
feedback into account. In this regard, it should also be tested how different 
demographic groups perceive the costs of technology usage (Read, 2019). If a DPHI 
is targeted at a certain group within society, for instance, at people of older age or 
mothers of infants, the design of the intervention should be adjusted according to the 
skills and user behavior of the respective group.  
Concerning the technology design it is also worth considering who develops and 
runs a DPHI. Survey evidence suggests that the trust in and the reputation of the 
institution or company that designs and implements an intervention plays an 
important role for the participation decision. Keusch et al. (2019) find in a survey 
among 1,947 people that the willingness to download an app in order to participate 
in data collection for research purposes is higher when the study is conducted by a 
university than when it is conducted by a research company. Simko et al. (2020) 
document that people are more willing to adopt a contact tracing app that is 
developed by a company or institution that they already know and trust with regard 
to privacy and security issues. In their survey, this results in higher support for 
Google and Apple as potential app providers, compared to Facebook and ByteDanc. 
They also document higher trust in universities as DPHI developers, compared to 
government institutions and activist groups. 
Furthermore, participants’ trust in the technology could be increased by giving 
adopters control over the data they share through the DPHI (Keusch et al., 2019). 
Asking people for consent each time their collected data is accessed or used for further 
analysis might be a means to implement such data sovereignty. The net effects are 
not necessarily positive, however. On the one hand, such features increase 
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transparency and user autonomy and might mitigate concerns about surveillance and 
privacy invasion, which might lead to a positive effect on participation (Mello & 
Wang, 2020). On the other hand, the need for explicit consent draws attention to 
privacy concerns (Marreiros et al., 2017) and increases effort. 
Finally, the technology of DPHI should be reliable. DPHI participation might 
be adversely affected by the diffusion of incorrect information via the system or 
technical problems. The accuracy and reliable functioning of an intervention therefore 
needs to be ensured before starting the roll-out process in order to avoid undermined 
trust as a consequence of errors (Bonardi et al., 2020; Kaptchuk et al., 2020). Errors 
occurring during the deployment of a DPHI need to be communicated clearly and 
transparently. 
6. Digital contact tracing as a digital public health 
intervention 
6.1. Benefits of digital contact tracing 
The key non-pharmaceutical intervention to manage epidemics is to isolate the 
infected as well as tracing, testing and – if necessary – isolating their contacts. The 
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has shown, that such test-trace-isolate strategies are limited 
by the capacity of public health authorities to reconstruct chains of infection. 
Furthermore, tracing contacts has natural limits in the memory of infected people of 
who they met and in the anonymity of casual contacts in public spaces. These 
problems might be exacerbated by characteristics of the pathogens and the illnesses 
they cause. In case of SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19, the illness caused by the virus, 
a significant share of the transmissions appear to take place before the transmitting 
person has developed symptoms and the median time period between the infection 
of a person and the onward transmission to another person is only about 5 days 
(Cheng et al., 2020; Ferretti et al., 2020). These characteristics increase the length of 
the potential chains of infection and can lead to a “curse of dimensionality” for 
contact tracing. When contact tracing either becomes infeasible or too inaccurate, 
stricter measures to contain an epidemic might become necessary. During the SARS-
CoV-2 pandemic, this included the closure of businesses, schools and cultural life as 
well as limits to the freedom of movement. Such measures bear significant economic 
and social costs. Mulligan (2020), for instance, estimates that each workday at which 
non-essential businesses and activities are shut down in the US due to lockdown 
measures reduces the country’s economic welfare by about 28.2 billion US-Dollars. 
A technological way to increase the capacity, speed and scope of contact tracing 
is digital contact tracing. The basic idea is that a mobile application records data on 
meetings or encounters of users of the application. If an app user tests positive for a 
pathogen after such an event, the data collected by the app can be used to reconstruct 
at-risk contacts and thereby parts of potential chains of infection. Ideally, the app 
includes the functionality to inform these contacts at high speed, to arrange clinical 
tests for the pathogen and to organize quarantine. In the case of the SARS-CoV-2 
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pandemic, Ferretti et al. (2020) estimate that widely adopted digital contact tracing 
technology could even deem mass quarantine (“lockdown”) unnecessary. 
6.2. Approaches to digital contact tracing 
Digital contact tracing technologies differ in a number of dimensions. One design 
dimension is whether it tries to record locations or proximity to other technology 
users. Location could be recorded through GPS sensors included in most modern 
smartphones or through location triangulation with the help of cell-phone masts. 
Proximity could be measured through the strength of Bluetooth signals or ultrasound 
signals, which most modern smartphones are capable of sending and receiving. All 
these technologies could also be used together, potentially balancing off each other’s 
weaknesses. Given the prevalence of the necessary sensors, smartphones are a natural 
candidate for implementing contact tracing technology in the form of a mobile app. 
During the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, Bluetooth-based proximity tracing became the 
norm. 
Another design dimension is how the records of locations or encounters are 
stored and how they are used to inform technology users about their status. The two 
most frequently discussed models are a “centralized” and a “decentralized” approach. 
Contrary to what the terms might suggest, there exists a central server run by a 
central party in both models. The app of a user records the location or proximity 
relative other app users. The app users identify each other with an identifier, such as 
a hash key. If priority were to be given to data protection, this hash key could be 
randomly generated and regularly changing. In case of an infection, data is 
transferred to the central server. Under the decentralized approach, this data only 
contains the hash key of the infected app user. Other app users have access to the 
centralized server, can compare their collected list of keys with the keys of infected 
app users stored on the server. If their list of keys includes the key of an infected app 
user, the app can inform its user about the at-risk contact. Under the centralized 
approach, the data transferred to the server upon an infection contains the hash keys 
of the user as well as all recorded at-risk contacts. The central authority then can 
transparently redraw potential paths of infections and inform at-risk app users. In 
both cases it is necessary to develop a logic according to which at-risk contacts are 
defined, such as how long a user needs to have exposure to other users and at what 
distance. 
Other design dimensions include how an infected app user is identified in the 
first place, how this information is fed into the app, whether such reporting to the 
app is mandatory of voluntary, how users can or have to react to at-risk contacts, 
whether and how public health authority contact is established and how follow-up 
testing procedures are integrated into such an app. 
During the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, several countries introduced digital contact 
tracing. China, South Korea and Israel were particularly fast to use mobile phone 
location data for contact tracing and quarantine surveillance (Amit et al., 2020; Budd 
et al., 2020). The “TraceTogether” app introduced in Singapore in March 2020 was 
an early centralized approach to app-based digital contact tracing via Bluetooth 
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(Mello & Wang, 2020). In the following months, a number of public and private 
initiatives in several countries started to develop solutions for digital contact tracing. 
To mitigate privacy concerns, many approaches, such as “PACT” and “DP-3T”, are 
built on privacy preserving protocols. These protocols use a Bluetooth-based 
decentralized design, with Apple and Google providing specialized interfaces in their 
respective smartphone operating systems in order to give more elaborate access to 
Bluetooth sensors. Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Canada, Japan, Malaysia and several 
other countries built their contact tracing apps base on these interfaces. The majority 
of these apps uses randomly generated, frequently changing hash keys to 
anonymously identify their users and require user consent for reporting the personal 
identifiers to a central server after being tested positive for the virus (Sharon, 2020). 
Starting October 2020, several national apps are planned to become interoperable, 
particularly in order to improve their utility in border regions and with increasing 
international travel (Salathé et al., 2020). 
Digital contact tracing requires several user activities to work effectively and 
each activity involves private costs and benefits as well as public benefits. As pointed 
out by Bonardi et al. (2020), contact tracing apps such as the ones introduced in 
Germany and Switzerland which are based on fully voluntary participation require 
users to take several steps to function effectively. Users need to download the mobile 
application, keep it constantly active on the smartphone they carry with them, react 
to the alerts received via the app (e.g. self-isolation, getting tested) and they need to 
be willing to report their own SARS-CoV-2 infection to the app. These activities 
involve private costs, such as effort, perceived risks to privacy, disutility from 
receiving unpleasant information (e.g. about being at risk for having contracted the 
disease), and public benefits, such as the possibility to control virus spread at the 
community level. Costs and benefits weigh differently in different activities. Keeping 
the app active on one’s phone and receiving alerts arguably also involves significant 
private benefits as a user might be able to learn early on about her own infection and 
thereby protect those she cares about and adjust her own behavior to reduce the risk 
of a severe course of the disease. However, private benefits are arguably not apparent 
when revealing one’s own infection to the system. In this case, private costs have to 
be weighed against purely public benefits which might result in cooperation problems. 
Another relevant aspect is that strong network effects are present in the case of digital 
contact tracing. The benefits from digital contact tracing grow exponentially in the 
number of participants (Ferretti et al., 2020). 
6.3. Participation in digital contact tracing 
Surveys conducted during the first wave of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic suggest 
a relatively high willingness to participate in digital contact tracing across several 
countries. Altmann et al. (2020) conducted online surveys among almost 6,000 
participants at the end of March of 2020 to assess the potential for digital contact 
tracing in Germany, France, Italy, the UK and the US. Across all five countries, the 
majority of survey participants expressed their willingness to install a digital contact 
tracing app. Support was found to be above 65 percent in all countries, ranging to 
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up to 85 percent in Italy. More than 90 percent of survey participants in all countries 
claimed that they would at least probably comply with an app alert, meaning that 
they would self-isolate when notified. Concerns about government surveillance, 
general privacy risks and psychological stress are named as the main reasons against 
participation in the intervention. The protection of family and friends, a general 
responsibility towards the community and receiving information about one’s own 
infection risk were the main motives favoring the installation of the app. These results 
are mostly confirmed by Ebert & Widmer (2020) who find that 68 percent of survey 
participants in Switzerland respond that they would probably install a privacy 
preserving contact tracing app. Kaptchuck et al. (2020) and Simko et al. (2020) find 
in surveys conducted in the US intended participation ranging from 70 to 80 percent 
for apps with a high level of privacy protection. The survey by Kaptchuck et al. 
(2020) also points to the importance of the accuracy of digital contact tracing for the 
willingness to adopt it. In contrast to those findings, Blom et al. (2020) document a 
willingness to adopt the – at the time – recently launched German contact tracing 
app of only about 35 percent among the 3,276 participants in their survey. They 
point to the fact that this is driven by older people showing a high willingness to 
adopt but lacking technology access and digital literacy, while younger people have 
access and ability but a lower willingness to install the app.  
Empirical evidence shows adoption rates of digital contact tracing that are 
significantly below the about 60 percent required in a population to suppress the 
spread of the pandemic without any further public health interventions (Ferretti et 
al., 2020; Hinch et al., 2020). Figure 2 plots the total number of downloads of the 
German, Singaporean and Swiss contact tracing apps since their respective launch 
dates. Adoption grows strongly at first but growth decelerates relatively quickly. It 
is important to note that not everybody who downloaded the app does actively use 
it. Salathé et al. (2020) report that between July 23, 2020 and August 31, 2020 1,054 
SARS-CoV-2 cases, 12.4 percent of all confirmed cases in Switzerland in this period, 
have been reported by users to the contact tracing app. 
7. Recommendations for fostering participation in digital 
contact tracing 
The relatively low adoption rates of digital contact tracing apps during the 
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic illustrate, that wide participation in DPHIs can be difficult 
to come by. Since the technology and implementation processes are still evolving at 
the time of this writing and strategies for digital contact tracing vary widely around 
the globe, it is difficult to get a detailed picture of which measures were taken so far 
to increase participation. In this section, we build on the framework developed in 
chapter 5 and develop general recommendations on how participation in digital 
contact tracing could be fostered. We assume that participation is voluntary and that 
participants have to be convinced of adopting and using a contact tracing app. 
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7.1. Information provision 
Involving prominent and trusted figures from different ideological and political 
groups in information campaigns and letting them deliver a consistent message can 
increase the effectiveness and reach of such campaigns. This is a measure to counter 
false information about the risks and benefits of digital contact tracing with 
consistent information provided by credible sources. The goal is that potential 
participants update their beliefs according to this information, which might lead to 
increased perceived benefits and reduced perceived costs of participation and thereby 
to increased willingness to adopt the app. Well-known science journalists, scientists 
and physicians could be particularly effective communicators, since trust in them 
might be reinforced by their expertise. The messages delivered should be based on 
best scientific evidence, transparent and clear. As the understanding of the public 
health threat evolves, recommendations might need to change. In such cases, 
transparency can help to avoid misunderstandings and the formation of miscalibrated 
expectations. The same applies to potential technical problems with a contact tracing 
app. Furthermore, it is also important to avoid a false sense of safety associated with 
participating in digital contact tracing which could lead to risky behavior. It should 
be clarified that digital contact tracing is a complement but not a substitute for other 
measures, such as physical distancing and wearing of a face mask (Raskar et al., 
2020). 
Messages about digital contact tracing can be framed to influence people’s 
perceptions about the costs and benefits of the intervention. A focus on the public 
benefits of participation, on participation as a way to contribute to a public good, 
can appeal to people’s intrinsic motivation. However, such an approach alone is not 
necessarily effective when people perceive significant private costs. Therefore, the 
private benefits from participation and the benefits to one’s immediate social 
environment should be pointed out to further enforce incentives for participation 
(Bonardi et al., 2020). A clear presentation of the trade-offs involved might also foster 
adoption. For instance, clearly stating that the alternatives to digital contact tracing 
are an aggravating public health crisis with increasing death toll or major lockdown 
measures with heavy economic consequences could increase support for this relatively 
mild intervention. Correcting misperceptions about the pandemic like a lack of 
comprehension of its exponential growth dynamics might further increase the 
efficiency of such messages (Lammers et al., 2020). Digital contact tracing could also 
be compared to traditional contact tracing or to well-known other apps, which people 
find acceptable despite their associated privacy risks (Bonardi et al., 2020; Buzzell, 
2020). This might decrease the relative perceived costs of digital contact tracing by 
putting them into context. 
Furthermore, false information on privacy risks, increased government 
surveillance or other potential concerns need to be counteracted. One instrument 
could be to clearly mark verified information, for instance, on government or public 
health authority’s websites or social media accounts. Involving experts and 
institutions that are perceived as independent in the communication of verified 
messages could increase their credibility. Another instrument could be the flagging 
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of false information on social media platforms and other media used to spread 
nonfactual claims (Nyhan, 2020; Swire-Thompson & Lazer, 2020). 
The effectiveness of information campaigns could also be increased by targeting. 
Tailored messages could be delivered to people with the highest risk of spreading the 
virus, for instance young and mobile individuals who interact in large social networks. 
Even if a similar message is communicated to all parts of society, the intensity of 
communication effort should be varied according to where a stronger adoption would 
have greatest impact. One obvious way is to address regional variation in the 
contraction of the pathogen, with higher exposure areas being targeted with 
information campaigns to a greater extend. This is also in accordance with the local 
public good character of digital contact tracing. An individual’s or community’s 
benefits from digital contact tracing depend mostly on the adoption rates among the 
people within that community, since community members are most likely to 
encounter each other regularly (Vaithianathan et al., 2020). The benefits of the 
intervention – especially to an individual’s close social environment – could quickly 
become salient and positive experiences within one community can lead to spill-overs 
in adoption behavior to other communities through social learning. If reliable 
knowledge of social networks within society exist, it might also be feasible to use 
information on the location of an individual within the social graph for micro-
targeting, where information is provided to specific individuals with the intention of 
them effectively spreading in the social network. However, the necessary information 
on actual social networks is usually difficult to come by. 
7.2. Explicit incentives 
Material rewards can incentivize the participation in digital contact tracing if 
they are complementary to intrinsic motivation. To achieve this, referral bonuses or 
other forms of explicit incentives for app adoption should be accompanied by a clear 
message about their substantiation. The moral and prosocial component of 
participation should be explained, community feedback needs to be permanently 
collected and the observable effects continuously evaluated (Kranton, 2019). Survey 
evidence from the US by Frimpong & Helleringer (2020) indicates, that receiving a 
payment in exchange for downloading a contact tracing app significantly increases 
user’s willingness for adoption. Stated and revealed preferences might differ, however. 
One way of circumventing crowding-out effects might be to allow for voluntary 
sorting into either incentivized or completely intrinsically motivated app adoption 
(Meyer & Tripodi, 2018). Although the long-term effects of such schemes might be 
unclear, the more immediate observed benefits might balance out longer-term costs 
of adoption. 
Not only direct payments for adoption, but also other material incentives could 
be used to foster participation in digital contact tracing. Depending on the public 
health system, free pathogen testing for those who received a notification by the app 
and direct or financial support for those who voluntarily self-isolate when receiving 
a notification could decrease the perceived costs of app usage and thereby increase 
adoption (Bonardi et al., 2020). Furthermore, the provision of smartphones with a 
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pre-installed contact tracing app for free or at discounted prices to those who do not 
own a smartphone could help to ensure wide access (Loi, 2020). While such schemes 
might appear costly at first sight, the benefits could very well outweigh the immense 
costs of other public health interventions. 
Besides material incentives, non-material incentives for adoption should also be 
considered. Awards and social recognition could increase the perceived benefits of 
participating in digital contact tracing. Traditional awards – similar to those often 
presented in the context of blood donations – could be presented to people who 
continuously participated in digital contact tracing for a certain period of time or 
referred a certain number of contacts to the app. However, the scalability of such 
awards is limited since awards need to be kept short in supply to preserve their value 
as a sign of social distinction (Frey, 2007). They might therefore not be suitable to 
incentivize participation and adoption by many millions of people. Other forms of 
social recognition might be more efficient. First, the exclusive provision of items to 
app users that make their participation visible to others could serve this purpose – 
for instance, a t-shirt or a mug stating ‘I contribute to stopping the pandemic’. 
Second, sending a personalized text message to thank an app user for the continuous 
use of the app or providing users with a purely symbolic ‘gold status’ in the app as 
a form of referral bonus or reward for continued use. Even though such signs of 
recognition are not visible to others, they still might enhance self-identification with 
the community and increase intrinsic motivation (Gallus, 2017). However, it has to 
be noted that trust in and respect towards the institutions – which are in most cases 
related to the government – presenting such forms of social recognition is needed for 
these measures to be valuable to individuals (Frey, 2007). When trust in public 
institutions is low, this form of explicit incentives might therefore fail to have a 
significant positive effect or might even lead to public ridicule and rejection. 
7.3. Nudges 
Nudges offer a variety of possibilities to foster the participation in digital contact 
tracing. Making the installation of digital contact tracing the default option could be 
particularly effective. A contact tracing app could be automatically installed on all 
smartphones with the regular updating process but users remain free to stop the 
installation at any time or de-install again afterwards (Bonardi et al., 2020). Altmann 
et al. (2020) find in their study that more than 60 percent of survey participants 
express to agree with an opt-out design for digital contact tracing. However, such a 
nudge might also undermine people’s sense of autonomy and their trust in the 
providers of the DPHI. A less invasive option could be to send text messages 
reminding people of the public and private benefits for adoption and providing a link 
for installing the app. 
Another option are social nudges that signal to people that others also 
participate. Authorities might, for example, frequently publish and visibly 
communicate data on the share of the population that adopted the contact tracing 
app in a certain neighborhood. Or the app might inform individuals how many other 
people who use the app they encountered in the past week to encourage sustained 
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usage. Of course, such approaches only work when the adoption rate is sufficiently 
high. They are not a tool to boost adoption in early stages. Instead, they might even 
reinforce trends of low adoption so that this policy tool should be used with care 
(Bonardi et al., 2020; Michalek & Schwarze, 2020). People might also update their 
beliefs on the benefits of app usage when the negative consequences of not using the 
app are made more salient. If sufficient information on the effects of the app are 
collected, it might well be feasible to provide estimates for the counterfactual 
outcomes had digital contacts tracing apps not been adopted and to present them in 
an easily comprehensible format (Bonardi et al., 2020). 
7.4. Regulation 
A transparent and reliable regulatory framework for digital contact tracing can 
build trust and mitigate privacy concerns. The time period in which digital contact 
tracing is used should be limited. The operator of the digital contact tracing system 
should be a trusted and potentially civilian institutions to mitigate concerns over 
government surveillance. The data collected by the app should be minimized to what 
is needed for efficient contact tracing and access to that data should be restricted as 
much as possible. Mandating a privacy preserving approach to digital contact tracing 
by law could be helpful to foster participation. Furthermore, a guarantee that 
participation remains voluntary or conditionally voluntary encoded in law could be 
perceived as more reliable than lip service by politicians and public health authorities. 
The same applies to the establishment of an oversight board to ensure the compliance 
with the regulatory framework (Amit et al., 2020). Governments fostering the 
adoption of digital contact tracing also need to consider the potential adverse effects 
that other public health regulations, such as quarantine measures, can have on the 
willingness to adopt and use digital contact tracing (Lucas et al., 2020). 
7.5. Technology design 
Digital contact tracing apps should be designed such that the costs of 
participation are as small as possible while the benefits are salient and easily 
comprehensible. One aspect of this is the compatibility among different contact 
tracing systems – possibly also across national borders – to maximize network effects 
and thereby also the individual and public benefits of the intervention. Using the 
same technological design across countries or public health authorities is a 
prerequisite to interoperability. Furthermore, digital contact tracing apps should have 
low technological requirements, such as limited memory and battery usage on 
smartphones, and should be easily downloadable and usable even for those with 
limited digital skills. Trang et al. (2020) conduct a survey study in which they present 
different hypothetical scenarios for a contact tracing app to their respondents. They 
report that a highly convenient app design where the app operates smoothly in the 
background with automatic updates and requiring low levels of battery power can 
significantly increase the willingness to use the app compared to a lower convenience 
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design. This is especially true for undecided participants who do not yet have an 
established opinion on digital contact tracing. 
An important technological design feature is privacy preservation. Several 
surveys (Trang et al., 2020; Kaptchuk et al., 2020) suggest the importance of a 
privacy-preserving app design to decrease the perceived costs of adoption. High trust 
in the developers and operators of the app based on past experiences might also 
mitigate privacy concerns. Simko et al. (2020) report relatively high levels of trust in 
Google and Apple and in their products like Google Maps and Apple Maps. An 
integration of digital contact tracing in an app like Google Maps could therefore 
mitigate concerns, and also increase convenience (since potential users already have 
the app installed and know how to operate it) and facilitate opt-out approaches 
(contact tracing could simply be added to Google Maps with a regular update with 
the option to de-install the add-on). However, such an approach also involves 
significant concerns when a public health intervention is tied closely to a commercial 
product. 
Besides privacy preservation, the accuracy of contact tracing should be 
sufficiently high. Kaptchuk et al. (2020) find that the accuracy of a contact tracing 
app plays a significant role in the participation decision. According to their findings, 
false negatives – i.e. an at-risk user is not notified by the app – affect user perceptions 
more than false positives – i.e. people are notified to be at risk even though they had 
no risky encounter. A low app accuracy might lead to reduced perceived benefits 
from its usage and increase people’s uncertainty. Of course, false negatives are 
unavoidable, especially as long as the adoption rate of digital contact tracing remains 
low. Communication about this fact has to be transparent. Bonardi et al. (2020) 
suggest that the parameters that determine when a notification is send and when not 
should be set carefully to ensure a reasonable level of sensitivity but at the same time 
avoid a too high rate of false positives that might discourage users from app usage. 
An early test phase with selected users – like those who are especially technology 
affine or have a better understanding for how the app works – could help to evaluate 
and adjust the system to prevent larger systematic errors once the app is rolled out 
in the whole population. 
To increase the immediate benefits that people receive from installing and using 
a contact tracing app, developers might also consider to add additional features to 
the app. These could be, for instance, the provision of general recommendations 
regarding the behavior during the pandemic or frequently updated information on 
the regional development of the pandemic and on local hotspots that should be 
avoided. App usage would involve private benefits even before a user receives an alert 
and it becomes more salient that the app is actually working (Bonardi et al., 2020). 
Li et al. (2020) report that in their survey the hypothetical provision of information 
on local hotspots of SARS-CoV-2 infections adds to user’s perceived benefits from 
app usage and may increase adoption rates. 
Privacy preservation can be in conflict with such other activities to foster 
participation. For instance, providing detailed information on the positive effects of 
digital contact tracing in the community of an app user requires data collection based 
on location, which might be perceived as privacy-invasive. More generally, the 
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ongoing evaluation of digital contact tracing as a means to break chains of infections 
requires a certain level of data collection, which might raise privacy concerns. One 
way to counter these concerns could be to provide a second version of a given contact 
tracing app, which collects additional data. This app could be advertised to a random 
sample of citizens, with acceptance being monitored and making potential selection 
effects in participation visible. This sample could then be used to evaluate the efficacy 
of an app. 
8. Recommendations for further research 
All these proposed measures to foster participation would need to be properly 
evaluated. Ideally, the introduction of digital contact tracing apps is designed such 
that all data necessary to evaluate the efficacy of the respective design is collected. 
However, intentionally introducing experimental variation when rolling out an app 
requires levels of willingness to learn, scientific sophistication and technical literacy 
rarely observed in political circles and in public health authorities. During a public 
health crisis, these requirements might be fulfilled even less. In the absence of such 
experimental variation, quasi-experimental and other observational analyses could 
sometimes provide an approach for evaluation. Surveys and experiments with 
potential and actual app users could also provide a means to evaluate certain aspects 
of the related cost-benefit calculations, potentially even in real-time. However, given 
the multi-dimensionality of the measures to foster participation and their 
interdependence, only cooperation with public health authorities and other parties 
involved in operating digital contact tracing systems and intentional testing will lead 
to reliable evaluations. It is also an open question, to what extend successful 
dissemination strategies differ between DPHIs. 
More generally, the problem of increasing participation in DPHIs has similarities 
with problems occurring in development economics. Similar to development 
economics, hardly any particular measure to foster participation is likely to generate 
all necessary improvements on its own. It is more likely, that a carefully selected set 
of different measures induces greater adoption and usage. Implementation details, 
such as the format of information provided by an app, could matter greatly. The 
research approach described by Duflo (2017) as “the economist as a plumber” will be 
more suitable than that of an “economic architect”. The process of properly 
evaluating the different measures to foster participation in DPHIs is potentially long 
and tedious rather than a one-off effort with clear results. But similar to development 
economics, the scale of the problem which digital public health interventions have 
the potential to address should provide sufficient encouragement to pursue this line 
of research. 
One obvious general public health problem, which can be addressed by DPHIs, 
are epidemics other that than SARS-CoV-2. Digital contact tracing could be 
particularly helpful in such situations. Since most developing countries have 
leapfrogged to smartphone devices, the additional technological requirements would 
be modest even for them. Digital interventions to increase public health could also 
be a useful tool to move from national public health initiatives to global public health 
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initiatives. Viruses such as Ebola do not stop at country borders. If digital public 
health interventions were to be made freely available, interoperable and easy to 
adopt, they could provide the technological base for greater international cooperation 
among health authorities to tackle such pandemics. 
But digital public health interventions can reach much beyond managing 
immediate crises, as illustrated previously. They can also play a role in tackling 
slower-moving but nonetheless widespread health issues, such as cardiovascular 
diseases, the number one cause of death globally. For instance, experiments by Perez 
et al. (2019) with Apple’s smartwatch suggest, that optical sensors on wearable 
devices can potentially predict atrial fibrillation. Another experiment by 
Chandrasekhar et al. (2018) assesses the potential to measure blood pressure via a 
sensor integrated in a smartphone as a further means to monitor cardiovascular 
conditions. However, to make such approaches broadly available, large-scale data 
sets are needed, which rely on voluntary data contributions. Such voluntary data 
donations are also a prerequisite to develop personalized and precision medicine. 
Digital technologies enable the large-scale collection and analysis of individuals’ 
genotypic and phenotypic data if people are willing to share this information. Based 
on such analysis patients could receive tailor-made treatments for diseases, such as 
cancer, that take into account individual characteristics, which can result in increased 
efficacy, efficiency and safety of the respective therapy (Kohane & Altman, 2005; 
Kohane, 2015).  
However, widespread adoption and usage will be critical to the success of most 
such digital public health interventions. More contributions to the state of knowledge 
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